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BARGAINING FOR POWER:  RESOLVING OPEN 
QUESTIONS FROM NRG POWER MARKETING, LLC V. 
MAINE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
Michael Keegan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many industries are subject to regulation, whether by the federal government, 
the state, or both.  Electric utility companies’ retail rates are subject to regulation 
by the states, and their wholesale rates charged among enterprises involved in 
providing the electric power to retail sellers are regulated by the federal 
government.1  Under the Federal Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”), the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is responsible for ensuring that rates for 
wholesale electric power sales and electric transmission are “just and reasonable.”2   
The “classic scheme” of administrative rate setting called for rates to be 
established unilaterally by the regulated companies and set forth in rate schedules 
of general applicability (i.e., “tariffs”), subject to oversight by the relevant 
administrative agency.3  However, the federal government has regulated rates for 
goods and services transferred between businesses differently from the way rates 
between businesses and the public are regulated.4  The Supreme Court has noted 
that “[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged were 
often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, 
who could be expected to negotiate a ‘just and reasonable’ rate as between the two 
of them.”5  With the FPA, Congress departed from a strict scheme of tariff-only 
rate regulation,6 permitting wholesale arrangements between the parties to be 
established through individually-negotiated contracts, subject to FERC oversight.7   
Over the years, the number of FERC-regulated transactions has grown, and 
FERC and electric utilities have developed new contractual vehicles under which to 
transact.  Among other innovations, FERC has established organized markets, 
instituted a market-based rate program, and ordered electric industry restructuring 
(i.e., unbundling of power and transmission transactions).  In addition, FERC has 
required electric utilities offering transmission service to do so pursuant to a 
standardized tariff of general applicability, with rates established under the “classic 
scheme” of administrative rate setting mentioned above.8   
                                                                                                     
 * J.D., Cornell Law School.  Thanks to all those who provided comments on the ideas expressed 
in this article, and to the Maine Law Review and its editors for their work in the production of this 
article.  All remaining errors are my own. 
 1. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 478 (2002). 
 2. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824d(a), 824e(a) (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 3. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 478. 
 4. See id. at 479. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id.; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1956). 
 8. See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (noting that FERC 
had proposed and adopted the requirement “that public utilities owning and/or controlling facilities used 
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Another byproduct of the increase in FERC-regulated transactions is the 
greater reliance by FERC on the settlement process to resolve disputes involving 
jurisdictional rates.  One observer has stated that, “[a]mong regulatory bodies, 
settlement is most pervasive at FERC,” and “negotiated settlement has become the 
standard process for setting interstate gas and electricity rates.”9  In recent years, 
“approximately 80[%] of the contested proceedings set for hearing at [FERC] are 
settled”10 and approximately 90 percent of FERC cases set for hearing achieved a 
partial or complete consensual agreement.11 
Within this regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court in 1956 established the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine,12 which provides that when a challenge is brought to a rate 
that is set forth in a wholesale electric energy contract that is the result of 
negotiation and bargaining under FERC’s jurisdiction, FERC must presume that 
the rate satisfies the FPA’s requirement that all such rates must be “just and 
reasonable.”13  The presumption applies equally regardless of whether the 
challenge is brought by the buyer or the seller14 or by a third-party,15 and may be 
overcome only if FERC determines that the rate seriously harms the public 
interest.16  Courts have observed that the public interest presumption is “practically 
insurmountable” and that attempts to change rates when the presumption applies 
hold only a “dim prospect, hardly worthy of recognition.”17  If the presumption 
does not apply, FERC would examine the challenged rate under cost-of-service or 
other rate principles to determine whether the rate is just and reasonable. 
Decided in 2010, NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Public Utilities 
Commission (“NRG”)18 is the latest Supreme Court case to address the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine.  The case in NRG arose when utilities in New England proposed to 
FERC the establishment of a regional capacity market in an attempt to alleviate 
shortages in electric power supply in the region.19  The FERC proceeding was the 
                                                                                                     
for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce have on file tariffs providing for 
nondiscriminatory open-access transmission services” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 9. Stephen Littlechild, The Process of Negotiating Settlements at FERC, U. CAMBRIDGE 
ELECTRICITY POL’Y RES. GROUP 2 (Jan. 2011, revised May 2011), 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1116.pdf. 
 10. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE BUDGET 
REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 18 (2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/FY11-
budg.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 88.  The percentage of cases set for hearing that achieved a partial or complete consensual 
agreement were 91 percent for fiscal year 2008 and 90 percent for fiscal year 2009.  Id.  It was 88 
percent for fiscal year 2007.  Id.  
 12. See Mobile, 350 U.S. 332; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956). 
 13. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824d-824e (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 14. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 
527 (2008). 
 15. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 130 S. Ct. 693 (2010). 
 16. Mobile, 350 U.S. 332; Sierra, 350 U.S. 348. 
 17. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
 18. 558 U.S. 165, 130 S. Ct. 693 (2010). 
 19. “Capacity” is different from actual electric power.  For purposes here, the D.C. Circuit has 
explained that when a retail electric utility purchases capacity—as opposed to electric power—from an 
electric generator, the utility “compensates the generator for the option of buying a specific quantity of 
power irrespective of whether it ultimately buys the electricity.”  Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. 
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subject of much debate; but, ultimately, a settlement was achieved among 107 of 
the 115 participants to the proceeding.  The Settlement Agreement established a 
Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”) under which there would be annual price-
setting auctions for capacity.  On certiorari, the Supreme Court found that FERC 
had failed to determine whether the rates produced by the FCM’s auction 
mechanism were freely negotiated rates to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
presumption would apply in future challenges to those rates, or were unilaterally-
established rates to which the public interest presumption would not apply.  On 
remand, FERC determined that the FCM auction rates were not freely negotiated 
rates, but that it nonetheless possessed the discretion to determine in advance that it 
would presume the auction rates were just and reasonable in future rate challenges.  
A petition for review of FERC’s orders on remand is pending at the D.C. Circuit. 
This article argues that FERC’s determination on remand was incorrect.  
FERC failed to recognize that settlements are the result of negotiation and 
bargaining.  As such, rates established through a settlement agreement are imbued 
with the characteristics that the Supreme Court previously has determined trigger 
the application of the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption.  In this case, the 
Settlement Agreement does not contain a numerical rate for capacity prices, but it 
provides the mechanism through which the rate will be derived—the FCM auction.  
Because the 107 parties to the Settlement Agreement consented to the use of the 
FCM auction to produce the capacity prices, the rates paid by those parties should 
be presumed to be just and reasonable if challenged in the future.  If the rates paid 
by any of the eight non-settling participants are challenged, the presumption would 
not apply.  The effects of FERC’s decision are potentially far-reaching because of 
the number of rate disputes that are resolved through settlement. 
Part II of this article reviews the regulatory scheme under the FPA and the 
development of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, up to the Supreme Court’s 2008 case, 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty.  
The Supreme Court’s latest Mobile-Sierra doctrine case, NRG, is summarized in 
Part III, including the underlying proceedings at FERC in Devon Power, review by 
the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, and FERC’s orders on remand. 
In Part IV, the article evaluates how FERC resolved the questions remanded by 
the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit.  Part IV first summarizes the 
characteristics of rates to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption must 
apply—namely, that the rates are the result of negotiations and bargaining among 
the parties to the agreement.  This should include rates set forth in a tariff where the 
rates were established through a settlement, because settlements are the result of 
negotiations and bargaining as well.  Part IV explains that because the FCM 
auction mechanism is the result of a settlement among most of the participants to 
the FERC proceeding in Devon Power, the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
presumption should automatically apply to challenges to the rates paid by the 
settling parties. 
Finally, Part V describes the practical consequences that will arise from 
                                                                                                     
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 520 F.3d 464, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Maine PUC I] (quoting 
Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 474 F.3d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); 
NRG, 558 U.S. at ___,130 S. Ct. at 697. 
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FERC’s determinations in Devon Power.  Because FERC has failed to recognize 
that the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption must apply to rates set forth in 
settlement agreements, those rates may be easily challenged.  The effects may be 
far-reaching, particularly where such a large number of FERC rate proceedings are 
resolved through settlement.  
II. RATE REGULATION UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER ACT AND 
THE MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINE 
A.  The Federal Power Act 
Part II of the FPA20 vests FERC21 with jurisdiction over the electric utility 
industry, including over the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, 
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, and facilities for 
such sales or transmission.22  “[A]ny person who owns or operates facilities subject 
to the jurisdiction of [FERC] under [Part II of the FPA]” is a “public utility.”23   
Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA,24 which provide for the regulation by FERC 
of rates for the sale and transmission of electric power, are the “bread and butter” 
of the FPA.25  Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA are substantially identical to 
sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”),26 and decisions construing the 
analogous provisions of the two statutes are interchangeable.27  The fundamental 
command of these sections is that all rates charged must be “just and reasonable.”28  
This standard is modeled on the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”),29 which has 
required that charges for services rendered by common carriers be “just and 
                                                                                                     
 20. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824-824w (2010 & Supp. 2012).  The Federal Power Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 
74-333, 49 Stat. 847, amended the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063, 
by, among other things, adding Parts II and III.  The amended statute was renamed the Federal Power 
Act. 
 21. Prior to October 1, 1977, jurisdiction under the FPA lay in the Federal Power Commission 
(“FPC”).  However, on October 1, 1977, pursuant to the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. 
L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977), and Executive Order No. 12009, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,267 (September 13, 
1977), the FPC ceased to exist and its regulatory functions were transferred to FERC, an independent 
agency within the Department of Energy that was activated on October 1, 1977.  In this article, “FERC” 
generally will be used to describe both agencies. 
 22. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (2010).  FERC’s jurisdiction is limited, not general. 
 23. Id. § 824(e). 
 24. Id. §§ 824d-824e. 
 25. See JAMES H. MCGREW, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 21 (2d ed. 2009). 
 26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (2006); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 
348, 350 (1956). 
 27. Ark.-La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981) (citing Sierra, 350 U.S. at 350; Permian 
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 820-21 (1968)).  While NRG, Devon Power, and this article are 
primarily focused on the regulation of contracts for electric power and capacity under the FPA, cases 
interpreting the NGA are equally applicable to the arguments set forth herein.  Likewise, the arguments 
set forth in this article are equally applicable to analogous contractual arrangements subject to regulation 
under the NGA. 
 28. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824d(a), 824e(a) (2010 & Supp. 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717c(a), 717d(a) (2009 
& Supp. 2012). 
 29. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 531 (2008); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 (2002); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 417 U.S. 283, 301 & n.22 (1974). 
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reasonable” and has prohibited “every unjust and unreasonable charge” for such 
services.30  
Public utilities generally have been subject to rate regulation due to their 
position as natural monopolies.31  The paradigm that developed included regulation 
over both retail rates charged directly to the public and wholesale rates charged 
among enterprises involved in providing the goods or services offered by the retail 
seller.32  Retail rates were generally regulated by the states or municipal 
governments, and the regulation of wholesale rates was taken up by the federal 
government, since the transmission or transportation involved was generally 
deemed to be interstate in nature.33 
The “classic scheme” of administrative rate setting called for rates to be set 
forth by the regulated utility company in rate schedules of general applicability 
(i.e., “tariffs”), based on the model applied to railroad carriers under the ICA.34  
This system was adopted by the federal government because the innumerable 
“retail transactions of railroads made the policing of individual transactions 
administratively impossible; effective regulation could be accomplished only by 
requiring compliance with a single schedule of rates applicable to all shippers.”35 
However, the federal government has regulated rates for goods and services 
transferred between businesses differently from the way states and municipalities 
have regulated rates between businesses and the public.36  The Supreme Court has 
noted that “[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party 
charged were often sophisticated business enjoying presumptively equal bargaining 
power, who could be expected to negotiate a ‘just and reasonable’ rate as between 
the two of them.”37  With the FPA and the NGA, Congress departed from a strict 
scheme of tariff-only rate regulation.38  Under the FPA and NGA, Congress 
permitted wholesale arrangements between the parties to be established initially 
                                                                                                     
 30. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1(5)(a) (1988).  Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in 
1887 to regulate railroads.  In 1906, the Hepburn Act applied the ICA to oil pipelines as well.  Pub. L. 
No. 59-337, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 584 (1906).  Jurisdiction over oil pipelines was transferred from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to FERC in 1977 by the Department of Energy Organization Act.  
Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(b), 91 Stat. 565, 584 (1977).  The following year, Congress provided that oil 
pipelines were to be regulated under the version of the ICA that prevailed on October 1, 1977.  Act of 
Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. 95-473, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 1337, 1470.  The provision cited in this footnote refers to 
the 1977 version, which can be found in 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976), and as an appendix to the 1988 
edition of Title 49 of the United States Code, cited as 49 U.S.C. app. § 1 et seq. (1988).  A brief 
background to the regulatory framework for oil pipelines is set forth, inter alia, in Frontier Pipeline Co. 
and Express Pipeline LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 452 F.3d 774 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 31. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 17-25 (1988). 
 32. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 478. 
 33. See id. at 477 (citing CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 111-12 & n.5 
(1984)). 
 34. See id. at 478. 
 35. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1956) (comparing 
regulation of industries under the ICA to regulation under the NGA). 
 36. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 479. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id.  But cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 417 U.S. 283, 301 (1974) (“The [NGA] 
was patterned after earlier regulatory statutes that applied to traditional public utilities and transportation 
companies and that provided for setting rates equal to such companies’ costs of service plus a reasonable 
rate of return.”). 
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through individually-negotiated contracts.39  Protection of the public interest would 
be achieved through supervision by FERC of the individual contracts.40   
To that end, the FPA requires public utilities to file their individual contracts 
with FERC and grants to FERC the power to review rates subject to its jurisdiction 
that have been set initially by public utilities.41  The relevant subsections here are 
FPA sections 205(c), 205(d), 205(e), and 206(a).  Section 205(c) requires public 
utilities to file all rates and contracts with FERC.42  Under section 205(d), changes 
in previously-filed rates or contracts generally must be filed with FERC at least 
sixty days before they go into effect.43  However, FERC may under section 205(e) 
suspend the operation of a new rate for up to five months, pending a determination 
of the new rate’s reasonableness.44  If FERC has not reached a decision before the 
suspension period has expired, the filed rate shall go into effect, subject to a refund 
or adjustment to be made retroactive to that date.45  Section 206(a) authorizes 
FERC to modify any rate or contract which it determines to be “unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential.”46 
In 1956, in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp. (“Mobile”), 
the Supreme Court explained that sections 205 and 206 are part of a “statutory 
scheme under which all rates are established initially by the [public utilities], by 
contract or otherwise, and all rates are subject to being modified by [FERC] upon a 
finding that they are unlawful.”47  However, FPA section 205 “purports neither to 
grant nor to define the initial rate-setting powers of [public utilities].”48  Instead, 
the FPA (1) defines FERC’s review powers, and (2) imposes duties on public 
utilities as are necessary for FERC to effectuate its powers.49   
FERC’s powers are defined by sections 205(e) and 206(a).  Under section 
206(a), FERC may set aside and modify any rate or contract which it determines to 
be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.”50  The Court in 
Mobile stated that this was “neither a ‘rate-making’ nor a ‘rate-changing’ 
procedure.  It is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the first 
instance by [public utilities] and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy 
them.”51  Section 205(e) only adds to this basic power the “further powers (1) to 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 338-39; Verizon, 535 U.S. at 479.  When compared to the ICA, 
relatively few wholesale transactions were regulated under the NGA, and they typically required 
substantial investments in capacity and facilities for the service of a particular gas distributor. Mobile, 
350 U.S. at 339.  Such circumstances demanded individual arrangements between jurisdictional natural 
gas companies and their customers, natural gas distributors.  Id. 
 40. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339. 
 41. See id. at 339, 343 (construing the analogous provisions of the NGA). 
 42. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(c) (2010 & Supp. 2012).  
 43. Id. at § 824d(d).  FERC may, for good cause shown, allow changes to take effect without 
requiring the sixty days’ notice.  Id.  
 44. Id. at § 824d(e).  FERC may convene a hearing concerning the reasonableness of a new rate 
upon complaint or on its own initiative.  Id.   
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at § 824e(a).  
 47. 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956) (construing section 4(d) of the NGA). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 341-42. 
 50. Id. at 341. 
 51. Id. 
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preserve the status quo pending review of [a] new rate by suspending its operation 
for a limited period, and (2) thereafter to make its order retroactive, by means of 
the refund procedure, to the date the change became effective.”52  
The limitations on public utilities are set forth in section 205(c) and 205(d).  
Section 205(c) requires rate schedules and contracts in force to be filed with the 
Commission.53  Section 205(d) requires all changes in such schedules and contracts 
to be filed with FERC at least sixty days before they go into effect.54  The Mobile 
Court explained that section 205(d) was a prohibition, not a grant of power.55  
Otherwise valid changes to a contract cannot be put into effect without giving the 
required notice to FERC.56  However, the FPA does not say under what 
circumstances a public utility can make such a change.57  
In Mobile, the Court concluded that FPA sections 205 and 206 do not establish 
a rate-changing procedure or constitute a mechanism for initiating rate 
“proceedings.”58  Section 205 does not provide for the filing of rate “proposals”; it 
provides only for notice to FERC of the rates established by the public utility and 
for review by FERC of those rates.59  If a public utility has the power to make a 
change to a rate schedule or contract, then the change is effectuated upon 
compliance with section 205(d)’s notice requirement.60 
B.  The Mobile-Sierra Doctrine 
1.  Mobile, Sierra, and Memphis 
In twin cases decided on February 27, 1956, Mobile61 (discussed above) and 
Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co. (“Sierra”),62 the Supreme 
Court addressed the authority of FERC to modify rates that had been negotiated 
bilaterally and set forth in contracts.  In Mobile, the Court rejected a natural gas 
pipeline’s argument that NGA section 4’s requirement that all new rates must be 
filed with FERC authorized such pipelines to unilaterally change existing 
contracts.63  As explained above, the NGA did not grant extra-contractual power to 
jurisdictional pipelines.64  If a contract does not grant either party the unilateral 
right to make changes to the contract, no such right exists.65 
                                                                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(c) (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 54. Id. at § 824d(d). 
 55. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339. 
 56. Id. at 339-40, 341-42.  
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 342. 
 59. Id. at 342-43. 
 60. See id. at 342. 
 61. Id. at 332. 
 62. 350 U.S. 348 (1956). 
 63. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 337-38. 
 64. See id at 339-40. 
 65. See id. at 339-42 (noting that under section 4 of the NGA, otherwise valid changes cannot be put 
into effect without giving the required notice to FERC).  As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “[t]he 
contract between the parties governs the legality of the filing.  Rate filings consistent with contractual 
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However, the Court in Mobile noted that NGA section 5 authorizes FERC to 
investigate rates “upon complaint,” as well as on its own initiative.66  The Court 
reasoned that although the jurisdictional natural gas pipelines were not enumerated 
among the list of entities that might file a complaint with FERC seeking the 
commencement of an investigation, “there is nothing to prevent them from 
furnishing to [FERC] any relevant information and requesting it to initiate an 
investigation on its own motions.”67  If FERC concludes after an investigation and 
hearing that the rate in a natural gas pipeline’s contract is “so low as to conflict 
with the public interest, [FERC] may under [NGA] § 5(a) authorize the natural gas 
company to file a schedule increasing the rate.”68 
In Sierra, the Supreme Court applied the holding from Mobile to the analogous 
provision of the FPA—section 205.69  The Court concluded that a public utility 
could not unilaterally file a new rate under FPA section 205(d) that was contrary to 
the terms of an effective contract.70  However, Sierra involved an issue not present 
in Mobile—when FERC, under FPA section 206(a), was authorized to find that an 
existing contract rate was unlawful and to fix a new lawful rate.71  The Court 
explained that FERC could not find that an existing contract rate was 
“unreasonable solely because it yields the public utility less than a fair return on net 
invested capital.”72  Faced with the question of how FERC must evaluate whether 
an existing contract rate is just and reasonable, the Court explained: 
[FERC’s] conclusion appears on its face to be based on an erroneous standard . . . .  
[W]hile it may be that [FERC] may not normally impose upon a public utility a 
rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public 
utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or 
that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain . . . .  In 
such circumstances the sole concern of [FERC] would seem to be whether the rate 
is so low as to adversely affect the public interest—as where it might impair the 
financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other 
consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.73 
                                                                                                     
obligations are valid; rate filings inconsistent with contractual obligations are invalid.”  Richmond 
Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 481 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 66. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1938)).  NGA section 5(a) states that a 
complaint may be brought by “any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company.”  
15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1938).  The Court described these entities as “those who represent the public 
interest” and “those who might be discriminated against.”  Mobile, 350 U.S. at 345.  FPA section 206(a) 
does not enumerate or limit entities that may file a complaint.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1938). 
 67. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 345. 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Fed. Power Comm’n  v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1956). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 353-55.  FPA section 206(a) grants FERC the authority to prescribe a change in contract 
rates whenever it determines such rates to be unlawful, i.e., “unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.”  16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a) (2010 & Supp. 2012); Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353. 
 72. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 354-55. 
 73. Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted).  The Court noted that the purpose of the power given to 
FERC by FPA section 206(a) is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished from the private 
interests of the utilities.  Id. at 355 (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a)).  Therefore, a contract is not “unjust” 
or “unreasonable” simply because it is not profitable to the public utility.  Id. 
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From these two cases, the eponymous “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” was born.74  
The doctrine acts as a presumption when such rates are investigated pursuant to 
FPA section 206(a).75  As the Court has subsequently explained, under the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine, FERC “must presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated 
wholesale-energy contract meets the ‘just and reasonable’ requirement imposed” 
by the FPA.76  The presumption is only overcome if the contract seriously harms 
the public interest; that is, where the contract might (1) impair the financial ability 
of the public utility to continue its service, (2) cast upon other consumers an 
excessive burden, or (3) be unduly discriminatory.77  Indeed, “[t]he regulatory 
system created by the [FPA] is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily 
devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these 
agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”78  In neither 
case did the Court find that the public interest required the existing rates to be 
reformed.79   
Both Mobile and Sierra involved attempts by sellers to change rates set forth in 
existing bilateral contracts negotiated by the parties, and where the contracts did 
not otherwise permit such changes.80  In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the Mobile-Sierra presumption applies where rates are set forth 
in instruments other than individually-negotiated bilateral contracts, or contracts 
                                                                                                     
 74. The Supreme Court did not use the term “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” until 2008.  Morgan Stanley 
Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 551 n.6 (2008).  
Responding to Justice Stevens’s dissent, see id. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the Court explained that 
it likely had never before used the phrase “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” because the understanding of the 
holdings in Mobile and Sierra was uniform and no circuit split arose concerning its meaning until the 
Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision in the cases on review, Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 471 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2006).  Id. at 551 n.6. 
 75. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a). 
 76. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530. 
 77. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355; see Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 533. 
 78. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 534 (quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 
822 (1968)).  The Mobile-Sierra doctrine “recognizes the superior efficiency of private bargaining, and 
its purpose is ‘to subordinate the statutory filing mechanism to the broad and familiar dictates of 
contract law.’”  Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Borough of Lansdale v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); see also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he purpose of the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine is to preserve the benefit of the parties’ bargain as reflected in the contract, assuming that there 
was no reason to question what transpired at the contract formation stage.”) (citation omitted).  Mobile 
and Sierra “recognize that the FPA and the NGA provide that conventional regulation must give way to 
contracts that are the product of negotiation and market forces.”  Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra 
Rule:  Its Illustrious Past and Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L. J. 353, 358 (2000). 
 79. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 347 (1956);  Sierra, 350 
U.S. at 353.  Courts have observed that the public interest presumption is “practically insurmountable” 
and that attempts to change rates when the presumption applies hold only a “dim prospect, hardly 
worthy of recognition.”  Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 723 F.2d 950, 
954 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  One commenter has stated that “it could be said that it would be easier for a 
camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a utility to increase a rate protected by the Mobile-
Sierra rule.”  Gentile, supra note 78, at 356.   It has been observed that it is more difficult to overcome 
the public interest presumption than to meet the business judgment standard used in bankruptcy cases.  
See Kendall Hollrah, Comment, Learning to Live Together:  Exploring Interactions Between 
Bankruptcy Law and Energy Law, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 529 (2005).   
 80. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 336-37; Sierra, 350 U.S. at 351-52. 
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that specifically permit rate changes. 
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division 
(“Memphis”), the Court held that parties could include in contracts the right to 
unilaterally change rates at will.81  The Court distinguished the case from Mobile, 
noting that in Mobile, the natural gas pipeline had contractually bound itself to 
furnish gas throughout the contract term at a particular price and had “bargained 
away by contract the right to change its rates unilaterally.”82  However, the 
agreement at issue in Memphis did not state a single fixed rate, but included a rate 
provision that amounted to the pipeline’s “‘going’ rate,” reserving to the pipeline 
the power to make rate changes subject to the procedures and limitations of the 
NGA.83  The Court found that the pipeline, when filing a new rate with FERC, 
simply sought to assert, in accordance with the notice procedures in the NGA, its 
rights expressly reserved to it by contract.84  In a subsequent case, the Supreme 
Court referred to the rule from Memphis as permitting parties to “contract out of the 
Mobile-Sierra presumption” by including in their contracts a provision that would 
permit one or both parties to unilaterally establish a new rate that would supersede 
the existing contract rate.85  The Supreme Court has stated that Memphis is 
consistent with the lead role of contracts in the FPA’s regulatory scheme.86  
However, absent the presence of a “Memphis clause,” the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption remains the default rule.87 
Although the Court in Memphis did not, for purposes of its analysis, draw a 
distinction between rates set by bilateral contract and rates set forth in a tariff of 
general applicability, the arrangements at issue in Memphis involved such tariffs.88  
The Court noted that FERC had promulgated regulations requiring natural gas 
                                                                                                     
 81. 358 U.S. 103, 113 (1958).  See Jay A. Kyle, The Memphis Case, 8 AM. U. L. REV. 100 (1959), 
for a discussion of Memphis. 
 82. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 110-11 (quoted language at 111) (citing Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344-45). 
 83. Id. at 105, 110, 114 (quoted language at 105).  The provision read: 
All gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller’s Rate Schedule (the 
appropriate rate schedule designation is inserted here), or any effective superseding rate 
schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission.  This agreement in all respects 
shall be subject to the applicable provisions of such rate schedules and to the General 
Terms and Conditions attached thereto and filed with the Federal Power Commission 
which are by reference made a part hereof. 
Id. at 105. 
 84. Id. at 112.  
 85. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 
534 (2008).  Such provisions have come to be known as “Memphis clauses.”  See MCGREW, supra note 
25, at 201-02. 
 86. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, ___, 130 S. Ct. 693, 699 n.3 
(2010).  Memphis clarified that contracts regulated under the NGA and FPA command the same respect 
as any other lawful contract and that the governing statutes do not contemplate the encroachment on the 
parties’ contracts.  Kyle, supra note 81, at 109 (“The integrity of the contract would be defeated if an 
outsider could place his interpretation on the pricing clause diametrically opposed to the intent and 
objectives of the parties to the contract.”). 
 87. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 534; see also Texaco, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 148 
F.3d 1091, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (finding that no language is required to invoke the 
public interest presumption and that where there is no “contractual language ‘susceptible to the 
construction that the rate may be altered,’ . . . the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies”). 
 88. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 114-15. 
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pipeline companies to convert from using individual bilateral agreements to a 
“tariff-and-service-agreement” system.89  Under the tariff-and-service-agreement 
system, natural gas pipelines must adopt system-wide “tariffs” that establish terms 
and conditions of service for their customers and rates for different classes of 
customers.90  The tariff is not itself an agreement or contract between the pipeline 
and any customer.  Customers must execute their own agreements with the 
pipeline.  Instead of individually tailored contracts between pipelines and their 
customers, pipelines and customers execute “service agreements” containing 
references to rates set forth in the tariff’s rate schedules of general applicability and 
incorporating the tariff’s general terms and conditions.91  In Memphis, the Court 
was satisfied that the parties to such arrangements could permissibly reserve for 
natural gas pipelines the right to change their rates.92  The Court believed that it 
was not unlikely that customers would have agreed to be charged a “going rate” 
that could be changed consistent with the notice provisions under NGA section 
4(d).93 
The innovation of Memphis clauses and the introduction of the tariff-and-
service agreement regime for natural gas pipelines resulted in fewer Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine issues for the natural gas industry.94  However, the electric utility industry 
did not convert to a tariff-and-service agreement system for electric transmission 
service until FERC issued Order No. 888 in 1996.95  Until then, electric utilities 
                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 115 n.8 (referring to FPC Order No. 144, 13 Fed. Reg. 6371 (Oct. 30, 1948), codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 154 (1949)).  18 C.F.R. § 154.38(d)(3) (1949) reads in pertinent part: 
No Rule, regulation, exception or condition such as tax, commodity price index, 
wholesale price index, purchased gas cost adjustment clauses or other similar price 
adjustments or periodic changes shall be included in the rate schedule or any other part of 
the tariff which in any way purports to effect a modification or change of any rate or 
charge specified in the rate schedule, or the substitution therefor of any other rate or 
charge:  Provided, however, a natural-gas company may state in the service agreement or 
in rate schedules filed pursuant to § 154.52 that it is or will be its privilege, under certain 
specified conditions, to propose to the Commission a modification, change or substitution 
of the then effective rate or charge:  Provided further, That no such clause may effectuate 
a change in an effective rate or charge except in the manner provided in Section 4 of the 
Natural Gas Act, as amended, and the regulations in this part. 
 90. 18 C.F.R. § 154.38(d)(3); see MCGREW, supra note 25, at 201. 
 91. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115 n.8; see MCGREW, supra note 25, at 201. 
 92. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 114-15.  Order No. 144 states that natural gas companies’ service 
agreements and rate schedules could include “adjustment” provisions, and that such adjustments must be 
accomplished by filing new rate schedules in accordance with the Part 154 regulations. Order No. 144, 
13 Fed. Reg. at 6372.  The Court noted that “tariff-and-service agreement” arrangements were adopted 
by Order No. 144, see supra note 89, promulgated in 1948, but that until the case giving rise to 
Memphis, no party connected to the natural gas industry seemed to have thought that natural gas 
pipelines were precluded from changing the rates set forth in their tariffs subject to NGA section 4(d) 
and 4(e) procedures.  Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115.  In Memphis, the controversy did not involve a conflict 
between the buyer and seller under the contract at issue; the buyer supported the position of the pipeline.  
The objection was made by an end-use customer of the buyer.  See Kyle, supra note 81, at 102. 
 93. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115 n.10.   
 94. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 201.  It would be unlikely for pipeline-sellers to conduct a large 
portion of their business under long-term contracts at fixed rates that could not be changed to reflect 
changing costs.  See Kyle, supra note 81, at 108. 
 95. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission 
Service by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 
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had entered into numerous bilateral and multiparty arrangements for the sale of 
bundled power—that is, power together with transmission.96  Public utilities 
continue to enter into bilateral and multiparty arrangements for the sale of electric 
power and capacity.  Thus, Mobile-Sierra issues continue to arise in the electric 
industry.97 
2.  Morgan Stanley 
The next chapter in the story of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine came in the 
Supreme Court’s 2008 case, Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility 
District No. 1 of Snohomish County (“Morgan Stanley”).98  The cases on review in 
Morgan Stanley presented the Court with two issues for review: (1) whether the 
Mobile-Sierra presumption applies only if FERC has had an initial opportunity to 
review a contract rate without the presumption; and (2) whether the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption imposes as high a bar to challenges by purchasers of wholesale 
electricity as it does to challenges by sellers.99  The Court answered no to the first 
question and yes to the second.   
Under FERC’s market-based rate regime, a wholesale electricity seller that has 
demonstrated that it lacks (or has adequately mitigated) market power may enter 
into freely negotiated contracts with purchasers.100  Those contracts are not filed 
                                                                                                     
Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 
64,688 (Mar. 14, 1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, 
Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom.  Transmission Access 
Policy Study Group v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom.  
New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).  Memphis clauses are found in 
electric industry contracts and tariffs as well. 
 96. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 201-02. 
 97. For a discussion of the electric industry after restructuring, and the role of the Mobile-Sierra 
public interest presumption, see Stephen L. Teichler & Ilia Levitine, Long-Term Power Purchase 
Agreements in a Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677 (2005). 
 98. 554 U.S. 527 (2008).  As noted above, supra note 74, the Supreme Court did not use the term 
“Mobile-Sierra doctrine” until Morgan Stanley.  For a discussion of Morgan Stanley and its effects, see 
Richard P. Bress, Michael J. Gergen & Stephanie S. Lim, A Deal is Still a Deal:  Morgan Stanley 
Capital Group v. Public Utility District No. 1, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 285; John E. McCaffrey, 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 Revisits the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine:  
Some Answers, More Questions, 30 ENERGY L. J. 53 (2009).   
  Dissenting in NRG, Justice Stevens referred to the story of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine as having 
three “chapters”:  Mobile and Sierra comprise the first chapter; Morgan Stanley, the second; and NRG, 
the third.  NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, ___, 130 S. Ct. 693, 701-
03 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  One set of commenters has adopted Justice Stevens’ characterization 
(though disagreeing with his evaluation of the second and third chapters), referring to FERC’s order on 
remand in Devon Power as the fourth chapter.  David G. Tewskbury, Stephanie S. Lim & Grace Su, 
New Chapters in the Mobile-Sierra Story:  Application of the Doctrine After NRG Power Marketing, 
LLC v. Maine Public Utilities Commission, 32 ENERGY L. J. 433 (2011). 
 99. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530-31.   
 100. See id. at 535-38.  Prior to Morgan Stanley, there had been some discussion regarding whether 
the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply to electric power agreements entered into 
under FERC’s market-based rate regime.  See David G. Tewksbury & Stephanie S. Lim, Applying the 
Mobile-Sierra Doctrine to Market-Based Rate Contracts, 26 ENERGY L. J. 437 (2005). Cf. Gentile, 
supra note 78, at 387 (believing that the prospects for future litigation related to the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine were diminished in part because electric power sales are frequently at market-based rates and 
under standardized short-term contracts). 
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with FERC before they go into effect; instead, market-based rate sellers must file 
quarterly reports summarizing each of the contracts into which they have 
entered.101  In 2000 and 2001, prices for electricity in the western United States 
rose dramatically.   As a result, retail utilities entered into long-term contracts with 
market-based rate sellers that locked in rates that were very high by historical 
standards.102  After prices began to return to normal levels, many retail utility-
purchasers asked FERC to modify the contracts, contending that the contracts 
should be reviewed without Mobile-Sierra’s public interest presumption that the 
rates are just and reasonable.103  FERC disagreed, applied the public interest 
presumption to its review of the contracts, and determined that the purchasers could 
not overcome the presumption.104  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding 
that because the market-based rate agreements had not been initially reviewed by 
FERC, the public interest presumption did not apply to the challenges.105  In 
addition, the Ninth Circuit found that even if the presumption applied, the standard 
for overcoming the presumption is different when a purchaser challenges a high 
rate.106  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.107 
On its way to resolving the questions presented, the Court in Morgan Stanley 
reiterated and clarified several points about the Mobile-Sierra presumption that are 
relevant here.  First, the Court noted, as it had in Mobile and Memphis,108 that the 
FPA permits public utilities to set jurisdictional rates with electric power customers 
through individually-negotiated bilateral contracts as well as through tariffs of 
general applicability.109  For tariffs, as opposed to individually-negotiated 
contracts, FERC traditionally reviewed rates under the “cost of service” method, 
ensuring that a public utility covers its costs plus a rate of return sufficient to attract 
investment.110  Both individual contracts and tariffs of general applicability are 
subject to the FPA’s notice and filing requirements.111 
The Court next addressed how application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption 
fits within the FPA’s requirement that jurisdictional rates be “just and reasonable.”  
The Court noted that since 1956, FERC and the courts of appeals referred to two 
differing modes of review: one with the Mobile-Sierra presumption, i.e., the 
                                                                                                     
 101. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 537.  Sellers must also have on file with FERC a market-based 
rate “tariff.”  These tariffs do not set forth specific rate schedules, but simply state that the seller is 
permitted to enter into freely negotiated agreements at market-based rates.  See id. 
 102. See id. at 538-40. 
 103. See id. at 540-42. 
 104. See id. at 542-43. 
 105. See id. at 543 (citing Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 471 F.3d 1053, 1075-77, 1079-85 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 106. See id. at 544 (citing Snohomish Cnty., 471 F.3d at 1088-90). 
 107. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 551 U.S. 
1189 (2007).  
 108. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1956) 
(comparing regulation of industries under the ICA to regulation under the NGA); United Gas Pipe Line 
Co. v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1958) (distinguishing arrangement at 
issue in Memphis from that in Mobile). 
 109. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 531 (comparing the FPA with the ICA, under which regulated 
carriers could charge rates only pursuant to filed tariffs). 
 110. Id. at 532 (citation omitted). 
 111. Id. at 531, 533 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (2006)). 
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“public interest standard”; and the other without, i.e., the “just and reasonable 
standard.”112  The Supreme Court explained that, notwithstanding this 
nomenclature, the “public interest standard” was not a different standard from the 
statutory “just and reasonable standard.”113  Instead, the Court concluded, the 
“public interest standard” refers to the differing application of the just-and-
reasonable standard to freely negotiated rates.114 
Thus, FERC’s review of rates under the FPA’s just and reasonable standard 
must begin with a threshold inquiry: whether the rate at issue is the result of 
bilateral (or multi-party) negotiations and bargaining.  If so, FERC must apply the 
Mobile-Sierra presumption and can only make a finding that the existing rate is 
unjust or unreasonable—and, thereby, fix a new rate—where the existing rate 
seriously harms the public interest.115  Application of the presumption is 
appropriate because, “[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the 
party charged are often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal 
bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a ‘just and reasonable’ rate 
as between the two of them.”116  The Court in Morgan Stanley explained that 
Sierra provided “a definition of what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-and-
reasonable standard in the contract context.”117  However, if the rate under review 
is not the result of bilateral (or multi-party) negotiations—or if the parties to the 
arrangement state that the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not apply—FERC 
would perform its review without applying the presumption and review the rate 
under cost of service (or other) principles.118 
Establishing that the Mobile-Sierra presumption should be applied when rates 
are set through a negotiated agreement, the Court in Morgan Stanley answered the 
first question presented for review, holding that the FPA’s just and reasonable 
standard is not applied differently depending on when a rate is challenged.119  If a 
rate is one to which the Mobile-Sierra presumption should apply, the presumption 
applies each time the rate is reviewed by FERC.  The FPA does not require FERC 
to review the rate under cost of service principles before the rate can be reviewed 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. at 535 (citations omitted). 
 113. Id. at 535, 545. 
 114. Id. at 535. 
 115. Id. at 545-46; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).  In 
Sierra, the Court outlined three instances where a rate might harm the public interest:  (1) impair the 
financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, (2) cast upon other consumers an excessive 
burden, or (3) be unduly discriminatory.  Id. 
 116. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 
(2002)). 
 117. Id. at 546. 
 118. See id. at 532.  For a discussion of the cost-of-service standard of ratemaking as a basic standard 
of “reasonableness,” see, e.g., BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 31, at 108-23. 
 119. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545; see also Tewksbury & Lim, supra note 100, at 461 
(explaining that Mobile indicates that the statutory structure of the FPA and NGA does not support 
distinctions between newly proposed and already existing rates for purposes of determining whether the 
public interest presumption should apply); Bress, Gergen & Lim, supra note 98, at 301 (“In a regulatory 
scheme grounded on the ability of ‘sophisticated businesses’ to manage their own affairs and protect 
their own interests, there is no need for FERC to have an initial opportunity for plenary review before 
presuming that contract rates are just and reasonable.”). 
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subject to the Mobile-Sierra presumption.120  The Court stated that it was proper in 
a regulatory scheme to review rates set by negotiated contracts by evaluating 
whether the rates seriously harm the public interest, not whether the rates are unfair 
to one of the parties that voluntarily entered into the contract.121  Thus, FERC may 
abrogate a valid contract only if that contract harms the public interest.122 
Turning to the second question presented for review, FERC found that the 
Mobile-Sierra presumption applies equally regardless of whether the rate is 
challenged by purchasers of wholesale electricity rather than by sellers (as had 
been the case in Mobile and Sierra).123  The Court noted that the three factors 
identified in Sierra—where a rate might (1) impair the financial ability of the 
public utility to continue its service, (2) cast upon other consumers an excessive 
burden, or (3) be unduly discriminatory—were not all directly applicable to a 
challenge brought by a purchaser,124 and that the three factors from Sierra were not 
an exclusive list.125  Where the challenge is brought by a purchaser, the primary 
concern is likely whether the rate imposes an excessive burden on that customer, 
not other customers (as in Sierra’s second prong).126  However, the fact that the 
customer is the challenger does not transform the “excessive burden” prong into an 
inquiry as to whether the customer pays a cost above the public utility’s marginal 
cost, in effect reverting to a form of cost-based analysis.127  The Court concluded 
that the FPA intended to reserve FERC’s power to abrogate negotiated contract 
rates only for those extraordinary circumstances where the public would be 
                                                                                                     
 120. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545-46. 
 121. Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at 548.  The Court noted that FERC possesses the authority to set aside a contract if there is 
unfair dealing at the contract formation stage, e.g., fraud, duress, or market manipulation.  Id. at 547, 
552-55.  However, the Court cautioned that that was no reason that FERC should be able to abrogate a 
contract on these grounds without a finding of a causal connection between the unlawful activity and the 
contract rate.  Id. at 554-55.  If a causal connection is established, then the Mobile-Sierra presumption 
should not apply.  Id. at 555. 
 123. Id. at 548.  The logic from Mobile establishes that the Mobile-Sierra rule is rate-neutral.  See 
Gentile, supra note 78, at 363-65 (discussing earlier court of appeals cases that found that the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine protects high rates as well as low rates).  Moreover, FERC’s market-based rate regime 
eliminates a policy rationale that may be used for differentiating between so-called “low-rate” and 
“high-rate” cases because neither the buyer nor the seller enjoys the protections of the regulatory 
compact.  See Tewksbury & Lim, supra note 100, at 469-70.  But cf. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 55 F.3d 686 (1st Cir. 1995) (suggesting that the application of the public 
interest presumption might be more relaxed in non-low-rate cases (such as Mobile) or in order to protect 
third parties); Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 993 F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 
1993).  For a discussion of the Northeast cases, see Gentile, supra note 78, at 367-73 (noting, in an 
article published prior to Morgan Stanley, that the Northeast decisions might be the most significant 
Mobile-Sierra cases since 1956). 
 124. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548 (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 
U.S. 348, 355 (1956)).  In a market-based rate regime, under which the regulatory compact has been 
eliminated, the first prong from Sierra—i.e., impairing the financial ability of the public utility to 
continue its service—would not be applicable.  See Tewksbury & Lim, supra note 100, at 470. 
 125. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 549. 
 126. Id. at 548-49 (citing record below). 
 127. Id. at 550-51. 
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severely harmed.128 
III. NRG POWER MARKETING, LLC V. MAINE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
Two terms after Morgan Stanley, the Supreme Court once again took up the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine in NRG.129  In NRG, the Supreme Court resolved that 
application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend upon the identity of 
the person challenging the rate at issue—i.e., whether the challenger is a party to 
the contested agreement, or a third-party.130  The NRG case is discussed below, 
including the underlying FERC proceedings in Devon Power, review by the D.C. 
Circuit and Supreme Court, and FERC’s orders on remand.  
A.  Proceedings at FERC:  Devon Power LLC 
The NRG case arose out of New England’s difficulties in ensuring adequate 
electric power supplies and maintaining the reliability of the region’s electric 
transmission grid.131  For many years, the ISO-New England (“ISO-NE”)132 
imposed on retail utilities an “installed capacity” (“ICAP”) requirement,133 
requiring utilities to maintain specified amounts of ICAP based on their peak loads 
plus a reserve margin.134  For years, New England’s capacity market has been “rife 
with problems”135 and “the supply of capacity was barely sufficient to meet the 
region’s demand.”136  FERC, the ISO-NE, electric power generators, and retail 
                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at 551.  Although disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the two questions 
presented, the Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of FERC’s decision 
because of defects in FERC’s analysis.  Id. at 552-55.  
 129. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 130 S. Ct. 693 (2010). 
 130. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 696-97, 701.   
 131. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 696. 
 132. “ISO” stands for “independent system operator.”  “An ISO is an independent company that has 
operational control, but not ownership,” over the transmission facilities owned by its member utility 
companies.  See Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 468 n.2.  An ISO “provide[s] open access to the 
regional transmission system to all electricity generators at rates established in a single, unbundled, grid-
wide tariff . . . .’”  Id. (quoting Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
373 F.3d 1361, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).  In 2004, ISO-NE was organized as a “Regional Transmission 
Organization” or “RTO.”  Id.  FERC grants greater regulatory flexibility to RTOs, provided that they, 
among other things, “are regional in scope, have exclusive operational control over all transmission 
facilities within their control, and have sole authority to approve or deny requests for transmission 
service” over facilities under their control.  Id. (citing Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d at 
1365).  RTOs and ISOs may also operate regional markets for electric power and capacity.  See 
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. 
61,400 (Oct. 28, 2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-A, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,776 (July 29, 2009), order on 
reh’g, Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009). 
 133. In Maine PUC I, supra note 19, the D.C. Circuit noted that utilities generally purchase more 
capacity than is necessary to meet their customers’ demand for electricity in order to ensure that the 
utilities are able to respond adequately to unexpected fluctuations in demand.  Id. at 467; NRG, 558 U.S. 
at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697. 
 134. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,304 (2006). 
 135. Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 467.  As FERC has subsequently explained, “existing generators 
needed for reliability [were] not earning sufficient revenues (and [were] in fact losing money), and . . . 
additional infrastructure [was] needed soon to avoid violations of reliability criteria.”  Devon Power 
LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340 at 62,315. 
 136. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697; see also Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 467. 
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utilities made several attempts to solve this problem.137 
In 2003, FERC directed the ISO-NE to develop a new market mechanism that 
would separately set prices for capacity in different geographical sub-regions in 
order to encourage construction of new capacity in the sub-regions with greater 
capacity shortages.138  In March 2004, the ISO-NE proposed a locational ICAP 
(“LICAP”) mechanism that would set capacity prices for four separate sub-
regions.139  FERC established hearing procedures before an administrative law 
judge (“ALJ”).140  In June 2005, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision largely 
accepting the ISO-NE’s proposal.141  Several parties filed exceptions to the ALJ’s 
Initial Decision; FERC subsequently heard arguments, and thereafter established 
settlement procedures to allow the parties to develop a revised market proposal.142 
On March 6, 2006, a settlement was reached by 107 of the participants; 
however, eight participants opposed the settlement.143  The Settlement Agreement 
established a “Forward Capacity Market” (“FCM”) under which there would be 
annual price-setting auctions for capacity, held three years in advance of when the 
capacity would be needed.144  Each retail utility would be required to acquire 
                                                                                                     
 137. For example, FERC identified in the early 2000s several flaws in the ISO-NE’s then-existing 
ICAP market.  See ISO New England, Inc., 91 FERC ¶ 61,311, at 62,058 (2000); New England Power 
Pool & ISO New England, Inc., 100 FERC ¶ 61,287, at 62,259 (2002).  Among other things, FERC 
noted that the then-existing ICAP market lacked a “locational requirement element” and “believe[d] that 
location is an important aspect of ensuring optimal investment in resources.” New England Power Pool 
& ISO New England, Inc., 100 FERC ¶ 61,287 at 62,278. 
 138. Devon Power LLC, 103 FERC ¶ 61,082, at 61,266 (2003); see Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 468; 
NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697. 
 139. See Devon Power LLC, 107 FERC ¶ 61,240, at 62,020 (2004); Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 468; 
NRG, 558 U.S. at ___,  130 S. Ct. at 697.  Under the ISO-NE proposal, each of the four sub-regions 
would have a monthly auction for capacity.  Devon Power LLC, 107 FERC ¶ 61,240, at 62,022.  Among 
other aspects of the proposal, the ISO-NE would establish a demand curve that set the amount of ICAP 
that must be procured and the price for that capacity.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit noted that the term “demand 
curve” is misleading because, ordinarily, a demand curve is a model of the relationship between prices 
and consumer preferences in a free market.  Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 468 n.3.  However, under 
the ISO-NE’s proposal, the “demand curve” was an artificial construct that administratively determined 
the prices that must be paid for various quantities of capacity.  Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 107 FERC 
¶ 61,240, at 62,022). 
 140. Devon Power LLC, 107 FERC ¶ 61,240, at 62,020; see Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 468-69; see 
also NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697. 
 141. Devon Power LLC, 111 FERC ¶ 63,063 (2005).  The ALJ’s Initial Decision largely adopted the 
“demand curve” proposed by ISO-NE.  Id. at 65,211-63. 
 142. See Devon Power LLC, 113 FERC ¶ 61,075, at 61,271 (2005); see also Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d 
at 469; NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697.  The parties requesting oral argument were mostly state 
entities and retail customers.  See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,304, 62,306 (2006).  
Oral argument focused on whether the LICAP mechanism, or some other approach, would result in just 
and reasonable wholesale power prices in New England that would be adequate to encourage needed 
generation additions and whether LICAP or another approach would provide assurance that adequate 
electric generation capacity and reliability would be maintained.  See id. 
 143. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340 at 62,306. 
 144. See id. at 62,304, 62,306-08; see also Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 469;  NRG, 558 U.S. at 
___, 130 S. Ct. at 697.  For the three-year gap between the first capacity auction and the time when the 
capacity procured in that auction would be provided, the Settlement Agreement provided for a series of 
fixed, transition-period payments to generators supplying capacity.  See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 
61,340, at 62,308-09; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 469; NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697.  
Although the transition payments were included among the issues presented to the D.C. Circuit and the 
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enough capacity to meet its share of the total installed capacity requirement—i.e., 
the minimum level of capacity needed to maintain the reliability of the grid, as 
determined by the ISO-NE.145  The FCM proposal contained a locational 
component: before each auction, the ISO-NE would determine capacity zones by 
identifying transmission constraints.146 
Of importance here, § 4.C of the Settlement Agreement provided that 
challenges to both transition-period payments and auction-clearing prices would be 
reviewed under “the ‘public interest’ standard of review set forth in United Gas 
Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956)[,] and [FPC] v. 
Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 76 S.Ct. 368, 100 L.Ed. 388 (1956) (the 
‘Mobile-Sierra’ doctrine) . . . whether the change is proposed by a Settling Party, a 
non-Settling Party, or the FERC acting sua sponte.’”147 
FERC approved the Settlement Agreement, finding that it was a “just and 
reasonable outcome” and “consistent with the public interest.” 148  Among other 
things, FERC believed that the Mobile-Sierra provision “appropriately balances the 
need for rate stability and the interests of the diverse entities who will be subject to 
the [FCM’s auction mechanism].”149 
B.  Judicial Review:  Maine Public Utilities Commission v. FERC  
and NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Public Utilities Commission 
Several of the parties who objected to the Settlement Agreement sought review 
in the D.C. Circuit.150  Decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan 
Stanley, the court largely affirmed FERC’s decision.151  However, the petitioners 
prevailed on the Mobile-Sierra issue:  The D.C. Circuit held that the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine could only apply to contracting parties; therefore, the parties to the 
Settlement Agreement could not “thrust the ‘public interest’ standard of review 
upon non-settling third parties who have vociferously objected to the terms of the 
[S]ettlement [A]greement.”152 
                                                                                                     
Supreme Court, this article focuses on the FCM auction mechanism because the transition payments 
lasted only for a limited time, with the final payment made in May 2010.  See Devon Power LLC, 134 
FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 22 (2011).  As FERC explained in 2011, “the last transition payment was made 
over a year ago and, therefore, the controversy as to whether these payments represent contract or tariff 
rates is now moot.”  Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 28 (2011). 
 145. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,307; see Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 469; 
NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697. 
 146. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,307, 62,324-25. 
 147. Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,309 & n.29; see Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 
469; NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 697-98 (citations omitted). 
 148. Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,304, order on reh’g, 117 FERC ¶ 61,133, at 
61,712 (2006); see Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 469; NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698. 
 149. Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,335; NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698; see 
also Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 470. 
 150. Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 467, 470.  The court of appeals identified the petitioners as the 
Maine Public Utilities Commission and the Attorneys General of Connecticut and Massachusetts.  Id.  
However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in NRG stated that six of the eight objecting parties petitioned 
for review.  NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698. 
 151. Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 467, 470.   
 152. Id. at 467, 470, 476-79 (quoted language at 478); see also NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 
698. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in NRG to determine whether Mobile-
Sierra’s public interest standard applies to a “contract rate” regardless of the 
identity of the party challenging the rate.153  The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s 
judgment insofar as it rejected application of the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
presumption to non-contracting parties.154  The Court explained that if FERC itself 
must presume that a rate that results from fair, arms-length negotiations is just and 
reasonable, so too must non-contracting parties.155  The Mobile-Sierra presumption 
applies “because well-informed wholesale-market participants of approximately 
equal bargaining power generally can be expected to negotiate just-and-reasonable 
rates.”156   
Although the Court determined that the Mobile-Sierra presumption applied to 
third-party challenges, it pointed out that the doctrine did not overlook third-party 
interests:  rates may be rejected when they would seriously harm the consuming 
public.157  Moreover, limiting the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to challenges by 
contracting parties would undermine the stability of contractual arrangements that 
the doctrine sought to ensure.158 
However, the Supreme Court found that neither the D.C. Circuit nor FERC had 
previously determined whether the auction clearing prices qualified as “contract 
rates” to which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine must apply.159  Accordingly, the Court 
remanded that issue to the D.C. Circuit; and, if the rates were not “contract rates,” 
the D.C. Circuit was directed to resolve the additional issue of whether FERC 
possessed discretion to treat such rates analogously.160 
On remand, the D.C. Circuit first recounted the proceedings up to that point, 
noting that the “case has characteristics of a chameleon; it has changed its colors—
and its shape—at each stage of the proceedings.”161  Turning to the remanded 
issues, the D.C. Circuit noted FERC’s argument that, even though the auction rates 
were not “contract rates,” FERC nevertheless possesses discretion to approve § 4.C 
                                                                                                     
 153. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698. 
 154. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698, 701.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, following Morgan Stanley, 
commenters opined that the portion of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Maine PUC I holding that FERC 
cannot approve an agreement that would require application of the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
presumption to rate challenges brought by third parties was wrongly decided.  See Bress, Gergen & Lim, 
supra note 98, at 308-10; Catherine Ascani, Casenote, Deal or No Deal:  It’s a Deal in Morgan Stanley 
Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, 60 MERCER L. 
REV. 1025, 1041 (2009).  Cf. McCaffrey, supra note 98, at 76-78 (stating that the applicability of the 
Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption to challenges to rates by third-parties “remains a developing 
issue”). 
 155. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 700.   
 156. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 700 n.4.  The Court also noted that “‘contract stability ultimately 
benefits consumers.’”  Id. (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 551 (2008)). 
 157. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 700 (citing Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530).  Third parties could 
include end users, advocacy groups, state utility commissions, or elected officials.  Id. 
 158. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 700-01 (citing United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 
U.S. 332, 344 (1956)).   
 159. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 701.  As noted above, see supra note 144, the rates at issue also included 
the transition payments. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 625 F.3d 754, 755 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) [hereinafter Maine PUC II].  
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of the Settlement Agreement.162  However, the D.C. Circuit found that it could not 
determine whether FERC’s position was reasonable under the Administrative 
Procedure Act because “FERC never articulated in its orders a rationale for its 
discretion to approve a Mobile-Sierra clause outside of the contract context, or an 
explanation for exercising that discretion here.”163  The court of appeals explained 
that “FERC must explain why, if the auction rates are not contract rates, they are 
entitled to Mobile-Sierra treatment,” suggesting that FERC should clarify how “the 
auction rates reflect market conditions similar to freely-negotiated contract rates” 
or on what other ground FERC bases its asserted discretion.164  The D.C. Circuit 
remanded FERC’s orders approving the Settlement Agreement for further 
proceedings.165 
C.  Remand to FERC 
In response to the remand from the D.C. Circuit, FERC issued an order on 
March 17, 2011, to resolve  
whether the auction results [ . . . ] arising from a contested settlement approved by 
[FERC] earlier in this proceeding constitute “contract rates” where challenges can 
only be reviewed by [FERC] under a more rigorous application of the statutory 
“just and reasonable” standard of review; that more rigorous application is often 
characterized as the Mobile-Sierra “public interest” standard.166   
FERC noted that “if the auction results [ . . . ] are not ‘contract rates,’” there was 
the supplementary issue of “whether [FERC] may act within its discretion in 
nevertheless approving a settlement provision imposing the Mobile-Sierra ‘public 
interest’ standard on certain future challenges to the auction results and transition 
payments.”167   
As explained by FERC, the Mobile-Sierra presumption requires FERC to 
“presume that rates set by power sales contracts that are freely negotiated at arm’s 
length between willing buyers and sellers meet the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ 
standard of review.”168  However, where the parties have not agreed to set rates by 
contract, Mobile-Sierra’s public interest presumption does not automatically 
apply.169 
FERC found that the FCM auction rates were not “contract rates” that would 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 759. 
 163. Id. (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974) (“[W]e cannot ‘accept 
. . . counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action . . . .” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962)))). 
 164. Maine PUC II, supra note 161, at 759-60. 
 165. Id. at 760. 
 166. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 1 (2011), order on reh’g, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073 
(2011).  Although not the focus of this article, the rates at issue also included the transition payments.  
See supra note 144. 
 167. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 1.  
 168. Id. at P 10 (citing Morgan Stanley Capital Grp, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish 
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008)); Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 29 (2011) (citing 
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 530 
(2008)). 
 169. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 11 (citing Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 553). 
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necessarily be subject to the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption when 
challenged.170  In its order, FERC noted that the ICAP requirement is set by ISO-
NE, not the purchasing entities.171  FERC then described the FCM’s auction 
mechanism and explained that once a price is determined—i.e., the “market 
clearing price”—the ISO-NE “assesses each utility a capacity charge equal to that 
utility’s share of the installed capacity requirement multiplied by the market 
clearing price.”172  In a subsequent order responding to requests for rehearing, 
FERC stated that under this mechanism, the rates produced by the FCM auctions 
are “determined unilaterally by the ISO-NE tariff.”173  Further, because the auction 
applies to participants who did not agree to its adoption—that is, non-parties to the 
Settlement Agreement—FERC believed that the rates should not be considered 
“contract rates.”174   
Turning to the second question on remand, FERC began by noting that the 
FPA does not directly address how the “just and reasonable” standard should be 
applied or implemented in any particular context.175  As such, FERC believed that 
it “has discretion to consider and decide whether future challenges to rates should 
be evaluated under a more rigorous application of the statutory ‘just and 
reasonable’ standard of review.”176  FERC noted that it is not “bound to any one 
ratemaking formula,”177 and that nothing in the statute or case law precludes it from 
applying a standard like the “public interest” presumption when faced with 
challenges to rates other than contractually agreed-to rates, if relevant 
considerations make such application appropriate.178 
In the circumstances of Devon Power, FERC believed that it was proper to 
exercise its discretion and determined that it would apply a more rigorous 
application of the “just and reasonable” standard if the FCM auction rates were 
                                                                                                     
 170. Id. at P 2, 9, 13-14, 19; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 21-28. 
 171. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 13; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
22. 
 172. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 13; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
22. 
 173. Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 21. “[T]he terms of purchase through the [FCM] 
auction are set unilaterally by tariff.”  Id. at P 27. 
 174. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 13; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
25.  FERC also noted that because utilities buying capacity in the FCM do not actually participate in the 
auction that sets the market clearing price, the buyers cannot be considered to be contracting with the 
sellers of capacity.  Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 13; 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 23.  
Responding to requests for rehearing, FERC stated that nothing in the auction could “be reasonably 
viewed as voluntary agreements of any sort between the sellers of the capacity and the ‘buyers’ in the 
auction.”  Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 23. 
 175. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 15; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
30. 
 176. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 14-17 (quoted language at P 2). 
 177. Id. at P 15 (citing Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish 
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008)); Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 30 (citing Morgan 
Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532).  Because “the statutory requirement that rates be ‘just and reasonable’ is 
obviously incapable of precise judicial definition, courts have long afforded great deference to [FERC] 
in its rate decisions.” Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 30 (citing Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. 
at 532). 
 178. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at  P 16; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
31. 
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challenged in the future.179  FERC stated that the application of the “public 
interest” presumption would provide for rate stability while satisfying the “just and 
reasonable” standard.180  Because the rates resulting from the FCM auctions would 
share certain market-based characteristics with freely-negotiated contracts, FERC 
could presume that such rates would be just and reasonable.181  Furthermore, the 
Settlement Agreement might not have been reached without the inclusion of the 
“public interest” presumption in § 4.C.182 
Finally, FERC stated that in other contexts it might be unjust and unreasonable 
to lock in a more stringent application of the “just and reasonable” standard, where 
there are not broader goals and purposes at issue (such as in Devon Power).183  In 
each inquiry, FERC would focus on the particular facts presented.184  In orders 
issued after the remand order in Devon Power, FERC has directed parties that have 
reached an uncontested settlement to modify their settlement agreements so as not 
to impose the “public interest” presumption on future challenges or changes 
proposed by FERC or non-settling parties.185  In these cases, FERC found that the 
individual circumstances “did not rise to the compelling level of those present in 
Devon Power so as to warrant binding [FERC] and non-settling third parties to a 
more rigorous application of the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard of 
                                                                                                     
 179. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 17-20; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 
61,073, at P 32-36.  FERC also determined that it would implement the “more rigorous” application of 
the “just and reasonable” standard to any future challenges to the transition payments.  Devon Power 
LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 21.  FERC noted that the D.C. Circuit had upheld the reasonableness of 
the transition payments, id. (citing Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 470-75); that there was a heightened 
need for the payments because of the swift transition to the FCM auctions, id.; and that the transition 
payments lasted only for a limited time, with the final payment made in May 2010, making it unlikely 
that the transition payments would become unjust and unreasonable over time, id. at P 22. 
 180. Id. at P 17 (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,335 (2006) (noting that rate 
stability is particularly important because the case “was initiated in part because of the unstable nature 
of capacity revenues and the effect that instability has on generating units, particularly those critical to 
maintaining reliability”); Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 33. 
 181. Id. at P 19; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 32.  FERC stated that the FCM 
auctions provide a market-based mechanism for valuing capacity and that the forward-looking nature of 
the FCM provides appropriate price signals to investors.  Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 
19; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 32.  In addition, the locational component of the FCM 
ensures that new infrastructure development is properly targeted.  Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 
61,208, at P 19; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 32-33. 
 182. Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 35.  FERC noted that if the Settlement had not 
been reached, many of the deficiencies related to capacity shortages in New England might have 
persisted and litigation would have continued.  Id. 
 183. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 24; see Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at 
P 36-37. 
 184. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 24; see also Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 
61,073, at P 37 (stating that “various proposed applications of the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ 
standard, including the Mobile-Sierra ‘public interest’ standard of review, [will be] on a case-by-case 
basis”). 
 185. High Island Offshore Sys., LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,105 (2011) [hereinafter HIOS]; Petal Gas 
Storage, LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 (2011); S. LNG Co., 135 FERC ¶ 61,153 (2011); Carolina Gas 
Transmission Corp., 136 FERC ¶ 61,014 (2011) [hereinafter Carolina Gas]; S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 137 
FERC ¶ 61,081 (2011) [hereinafter SCEG]; Fla. Power & Light Co., 138 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2012) 
[hereinafter FP&L]; see also Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 36 (explaining cases). 
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review.”186 
FERC denied requests for rehearing of its Devon Power remand order on 
October 20, 2011.187  A petition for review of FERC’s orders was filed with the 
D.C. Circuit on October 31, 2011.188 
IV. RESPONDING TO NRG’S REMANDED QUESTIONS 
As explained above in Part III, the Supreme Court found that neither the D.C. 
Circuit nor FERC had previously determined whether the FCM auction market 
clearing prices qualified as “contract rates” to which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
must apply.189  The Court remanded that issue to the D.C. Circuit.190  If the rates 
were not “contract rates,” the D.C. Circuit was directed to resolve the additional 
issue of whether FERC possessed the discretion to apply the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption to such rates.191  The D.C. Circuit, in turn, remanded these questions 
to FERC.192  FERC determined that the FCM auction rates were not “contract 
rates.”193  Nonetheless, FERC believed that it “has discretion to consider and 
decide whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more 
rigorous application of the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review.”194 
FERC erred in its resolution of the first remanded question.  FERC should 
have found that, for the 107 settling parties, the FCM auction rates are “contract 
rates” (in the Supreme Court’s parlance) because, for those parties, the auction 
rates are the result of a negotiated settlement.  Therefore, the Mobile-Sierra public 
interest presumption should apply automatically to challenges to the rates paid by 
any of the 107 settling parties.  This article explores below the characteristics of so-
called “contract rates,” and suggests that it would be more accurate to describe a 
rate that is the result of successful negotiations and bargaining between the parties 
as a “bargained-for rate” (“BFR”).195  The term “contract rate,” particularly when 
                                                                                                     
 186. HIOS, supra note 185, at P 525; Petal Gas, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 17; So. LNG, 135 FERC ¶ 
61,153 at P 24; Carolina Gas, supra note 185, at P 18; SCEG, supra note 185, at P 5; FP&L, supra note 
185, at P 11; see also Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 36 (explaining cases). 
 187. Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073. 
 188. See New England Power Generators Ass’n Inc. v. Fed. Regulatory Comm’n, No. 11-1422 (D.C. 
Cir. Filed Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/court-cases/pend-case.asp#N.  
 189. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, ___, 130 S. Ct. 693, 701 
(2010).  As noted above, see supra note 144, the rates at issue in NRG also included the transition 
payments. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Maine PUC II, supra note 161, at 759-60. 
 193. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 13-14, 19 (2011); Devon Power LLC, 137 
FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 21-28 (2011). 
 194. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 14-17 (quoted language at P 2). 
 195. The term “negotiated rate” may seem more suitable, but that term already has a particular 
understanding among FERC and NGA-jurisdictional natural gas pipelines.  See Natural Gas Pipeline 
Negotiated Rates Policies and Practices, 104 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2003), order on reh’g, 114 FERC ¶ 
61,042, order denying reh’g, 114 FERC ¶ 61,304 (2006) (modifying FERC’s previous policy statement 
on negotiated rates); Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-Service Ratemaking for Natural Gas Pipelines, 
74 FERC ¶ 61,076, order on clarification, 74 FERC ¶ 61,194, order on reh’g, 75 FERC ¶ 61,024 
(1996). 
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distinguished from a “tariff rate,”196 fails to recognize that parties often negotiate 
and bargain for rates that are ultimately set forth in tariffs.  This article also 
provides examples of FERC-regulated agreements and explains whether such 
agreements are BFRs to which the public interest presumption should automatically 
apply.  Finally, this article answers the question remanded by the Supreme Court in 
NRG, explaining that for the 107 settling parties, the FCM auction produces BFRs 
to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should automatically apply.   
With respect to the second remanded question—whether FERC possesses 
discretion to apply a “more rigorous” application of the just and reasonable 
standard—this article suggests that FERC should not have determined in advance 
that it would apply a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard 
to future challenges of the auction rates paid by the eight non-settling participants.  
A.  Determining Whether the Mobile-Sierra Public Interest Presumption  
Should Apply Automatically 
Public utilities under the FPA may either  (1) “fix by contract, and change only 
by mutual agreement, the rate agreed upon with a particular customer”;197 or (2) 
unilaterally establish, and change at will, rates offered to prospective customers.198  
The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies to challenges 
to the first set of agreements—which the Supreme Court in recent cases has 
referred to as “contract rates.”  However, the public interest presumption does not 
(automatically) apply to the second set of agreements, which the Court has referred 
to as “tariff rates.”199   
Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, FERC “must presume that the rate set out in 
a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the ‘just and reasonable’ 
requirement” imposed by the FPA.200  The principal rationale for applying the 
presumption is that the parties who negotiated the rate are generally “sophisticated 
businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected 
to negotiate a ‘just and reasonable’ rate as between the two of them.”201  The 
hallmark of these agreements—which this article shall refer to as “BFRs”—is that 
the agreement contains a rate which was the result of successful negotiation and 
bargaining between the parties.  Thus, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine recognizes the 
importance of individual agreements containing BFRs and that the FPA’s 
regulatory scheme “contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in 
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”202 
                                                                                                     
 196. In both NRG and Morgan Stanley, the Supreme Court drew distinctions between “contract 
rates”—to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies—and “tariff 
rates.”  NRG, 558 U.S. at  ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698; Morgan Stanley Capital Group. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. 
No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 531-33 (2008). 
 197. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343 (1956). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 698; Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 531-33.  Because the 
Court appears to have distinguished only between “contract rates” and “tariff rates,” presumably all 
agreements to which the public interest presumption does not automatically apply are “tariff rates.” 
 200. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530. 
 201. Id. at 545 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 (2002)). 
 202. Id. at 534 (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968)). 
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However, the other category of rates under the FPA’s regulatory scheme are 
subject to a public utility’s right to unilaterally establish, and change at will, its 
rates offered to prospective customers;203 in other words, unilateral rates.  The 
Mobile-Sierra presumption does not (automatically) apply to such agreements.  
The Court described unilateral rate setting in a telecommunications case, Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, stating that under “the classic scheme of 
administrative rate setting at the federal level,” the “regulated utility companies 
[would set out their rates] in proposed tariff schedules,” such as those employed 
under the ICA.204  Interested parties would have an opportunity to comment, and 
the tariffs would be accepted by the regulatory agency so long as the rates 
contained therein were reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.205  The Court 
recognized the use of such tariffs of general applicability for the natural gas 
industry in Memphis206 and for the electric power industry (with respect to the 
transmission of electric power) in New York v. FERC.207  Under the tariff-and-
service agreement system, public utilities and natural gas pipelines adopt, subject to 
FERC approval, system-wide tariffs that establish the rates, terms, and conditions 
pursuant to which the utility company offers service to its customers, as those rates, 
terms, and conditions may be changed by the public utility or pipeline from time to 
time.208  Customers execute “service agreements” with public utilities or natural 
gas pipelines containing (or incorporating by reference) standardized language for 
terms and conditions of service and references to FERC-approved rates set forth in 
the tariff’s rate schedules of general applicability.209  When such agreements are 
challenged at FERC, or when a party proposes to change a rate unilaterally, FERC 
must perform its review without applying the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
presumption.210 
Thus, there are two types of regulated electric power agreements:  (1) 
agreements that contain BFRs, established by mutual agreement of the parties, and 
therefore, to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically 
applies; and (2) agreements that contain rates established unilaterally by a public 
                                                                                                     
 203. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343 (1956).  
 204. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 478.  In Mobile, the Court noted that the ICA required all rates to be the 
same for all shippers (customers) and that there was no provision under the ICA for the filing of 
individual contracts.  Mobile, 350 U.S. at 345.  However, the NGA and FPA recognize the need for 
private contracts that contain various rates, terms, and conditions, and provide for the filing of such 
contracts.  Id. 
 205. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 478. 
 206. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 114-15 (1958). 
 207. New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (noting that FERC had 
proposed and adopted the requirement “that public utilities owning and/or controlling facilities used for 
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce have on file tariffs providing for 
nondiscriminatory open-access transmission services”). 
 208. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115 n.8 (referring to the FPC’s Order No. 144, see supra note 89); 
MCGREW, supra note 25, at 201.  See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the tariff-and-service 
agreement system. 
 209. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115 n.8.  See 18 C.F.R. § 35.10a(a) (2012) (setting forth requirements for 
the inclusion of service agreements with public utility tariffs); MCGREW, supra note 25, at 201. 
 210. See Morgan Stanley Capital Group. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 
527, 532, 534 (2008); Memphis, 358 U.S. at 114-15.  FERC would review the rate under cost of service 
(or other) principles. 
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utility, often arising under the tariff-and-service-agreement method.  The public 
interest presumption does not (automatically) apply to such agreements. 
The Supreme Court has classified these two types of agreements as (1) 
“contract rates,” and (2) “tariff rates.”211  At first blush, this appears to be 
convenient shorthand; however, the Court’s terminology fails to recognize that the 
distinction between “contracts” and “tariffs” is not as clear as it once may have 
been.212  The term “tariff rate”—as distinguished from a “contract rate”—implies 
that any agreement that results from the tariff-and-service-agreement system cannot 
be the result of negotiation and bargaining and, therefore, cannot be automatically 
subject to the Mobile-Sierra presumption.  Similarly, the use of the term “contract 
rate” suggests that the public interest presumption cannot automatically apply to 
agreements other than traditional bilateral agreements.   
This article explains below that the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption 
should automatically apply to many agreements that include rates contained in 
tariffs.  Rates set forth in tariffs may, in fact, be the result of bargaining and 
negotiation between a public utility and its customers, particularly in the case of 
settlement agreements.  Therefore, the public interest presumption should apply 
when these rates are challenged.  Instead of “contract rates” and “tariff rates,” this 
article refers to BFRs and unilateral rates.  These terms more accurately describe 
the characteristics of the rates, and recognize that the rates set forth in tariffs 
frequently are BFRs to which the public interest presumption should automatically 
apply. 
B.  BFRs vs. Unilateral Rates:  Examples and Explanations 
The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption applies to FERC-jurisdictional 
agreements and rates that are the result of negotiation and bargaining between the 
parties, but the presumption does not apply to rates that are set unilaterally.  This 
section provides examples that illustrate the difference between the two.  The first 
examples discussed below are the most straight-forward:  bilateral fixed-rate 
contracts and tariffs, classic examples of BFRs and unilateral rates, respectively.  
The next example is that of unilateral rates set forth in bilateral agreements.  
Finally, this section discusses unilateral rates that result in negotiated settlements. 
1.  Classic Bargained-For Rates (BFRs): Bilateral Fixed-Rate Contracts 
The classic example of an agreement containing a BFR is a bilateral fixed-rate 
agreement between a utility company (seller) and its customer (buyer).  Both 
Mobile and Sierra involved bilateral fixed-rate agreements containing BFRs.213  In 
each case, the seller attempted to change the BFR set forth in its existing bilateral 
contract.  In Mobile, United Gas Pipe Line Company (“United”) entered into an 
                                                                                                     
 211. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, __, 130 S. Ct. 693, 698 
(2010); Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 531-33. 
 212. Another point of confusion that may arise from the use of the term “contract rate” is that it may 
suggest that other agreements are not contracts.  However, as explained above, service agreements that 
incorporate rates, terms, and conditions contained in tariffs create binding obligations on the parties. 
 213. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1956); Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 351-52 (1956).   
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agreement to supply gas to Mobile Gas Service Corporation (“Mobile”) for a 
duration of ten years at a rate that was the equivalent of 10.7 cents per MCF 
(thousand cubic feet).214  However, prior to the expiration of that agreement, 
“United, without the consent of Mobile, filed new schedules with [FERC], which 
purported to increase the rate on gas to . . . 14.5 cents per MCF.”215  Similarly, in 
Sierra, Sierra Pacific Power Company (“Sierra”) had entered into an agreement to 
purchase electric power from Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”) for a 
duration of fifteen years.216  However, prior to the expiration of the agreement, 
“PG&E, without the consent of Sierra, filed with [FERC] . . . a schedule purporting 
to increase its rate to Sierra by approximately 28%.”217 
In both cases, the agreements at issue contained BFRs.  United and Mobile, 
and PG&E and Sierra, respectively,218 negotiated and entered into agreements 
where the rate was the result of arms-length bargaining.  These agreements were 
traditional bilateral contracts and could not be changed without the consent of both 
parties.219  Because the agreements contained BFRs, the public interest 
presumption applied, and neither United nor PG&E was permitted to unilaterally 
change the BFRs in the agreements.220  In neither case did the Court find that the 
public interest required the rates to be reformed.221 
2.  Classic Unilateral Rates:  Tariffs 
Other agreements contain unilateral rates.  As the Supreme Court’s 
terminology suggests, the classic example of a unilateral rate is set forth in a tariff 
of general applicability.  As discussed above, the use of tariffs for federally-
regulated rates originated under the ICA.222  In Memphis, the Supreme Court 
recognized that FERC had directed natural gas pipelines to adopt tariffs for natural 
gas transmission.223  As part of the Order No. 888 series, initially issued in 1996, 
FERC required electric utilities to provide open access transmission service 
pursuant to a standardized, or “pro forma,” tariff, which was set forth in Appendix 
                                                                                                     
 214. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 335-36. 
 215. Id. at 336. 
 216. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 352. 
 217. Id. 
 218. As the Supreme Court suggested in Morgan Stanley and Verizon, these four parties—United, 
Mobile, PG&E, and Sierra—were each “sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal 
bargaining power,” and therefore should “be expected to negotiate a just and reasonable rate as between 
. . . them.”  Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545 (citing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 
(2002)). 
 219. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (stating that rates fixed by contract may only be changed by mutual 
agreement). 
 220. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 347 (finding that United’s unilateral filing of a new rate “was a nullity 
insofar as it purported to change the rate set by its contract with Mobile and that the contract rate 
remained the only lawful rate”); Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353 (concluding that PG&E’s unilateral filing of a 
new rate was not effective to change PG&E’s agreement with Sierra).   
 221. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 347; Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353. 
 222. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 478 (2002) (describing the use of tariffs as “the 
classic scheme of administrative rate setting at the federal level”). 
 223. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 114-15 (1958). 
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D of Order No. 888.224   
A tariff does not, on its own, constitute an agreement between the service 
provider and any customer.  Customers must execute “service agreements” 
containing references to rates set forth in the tariff’s rate schedules and 
incorporating the tariff’s general terms and conditions.225  Under a classic tariff 
scheme, customers do not negotiate with the utility the rates for service.  Instead, 
the customer must accept the rates set forth in the tariff.  The customer is protected 
because the regulatory agency, such as FERC, has found that the rates listed in the 
tariff are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.  Tariff rates generally 
constitute a utility’s “going rates.”226  When the utility determines that the rates in 
the tariff no longer provide it with a sufficient return, the utility may unilaterally 
seek an increase by proposing a new rate to FERC.227  The rate goes into effect 
automatically so long as FERC does not find that the rate is not just and 
reasonable.228 
Because the tariffs apply to all of the utility’s customers and tariffs are not 
limited to a specific duration, a utility must retain the right to change its rates when 
it requires a greater return.  FERC has recognized as much.  In Order No. 888, 
FERC’s pro forma tariff for electric transmission service provides that the electric 
transmission provider retains the right to unilaterally propose rate changes and file 
those proposed rate changes with FERC pursuant to FPA section 205.229 
3.  Unilateral Rates in Bilateral Agreements 
Tariffs are not the only contractual instruments through which a unilateral rate 
may be established.  Changes to a bilateral agreement ordinarily must be agreed to 
by both parties;230 but the FPA’s regulatory scheme permits parties to include in 
                                                                                                     
 224. Order No. 888, supra note 95, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,706-24.  As opposed to natural gas pipelines, 
which were permitted to propose their own individual tariffs, FERC-regulated public utilities providing 
transmission service were required to adopt the pro forma tariff.  Utilities were permitted to propose 
deviations from the pro forma tariff if those individual changes could be shown to be consistent with, or 
superior to, the pro forma tariff.  Id. at 21,619. 
 225. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115 n.8; see MCGREW, supra note 25, at 188-89, 201. 
 226. See Memphis, 358 U.S. at 105, 110, 114. 
 227. Memphis, 358 U.S. at 115 n.8 (noting that FERC expressly contemplated that a seller would 
reserve for itself the right to change rates under section 4 of the NGA). 
 228. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824d(a), (d) (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 229. Order No. 888, supra note 95, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,710.  The provision, section 9 of the pro forma 
tariff, provides, in relevant part: 
Nothing contained in the Tariff or any Service Agreement shall be construed as affecting 
in any way the right of the Transmission Provider to unilaterally make application to the 
Commission for a change in rates, terms and conditions, charges, classification of service, 
Service Agreement, rule or regulation under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act and 
pursuant to the Commission’s rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
The provision also provides that customers retain their rights to seek redress under FPA section 206: 
Nothing contained in the Tariff or any Service Agreement shall be construed as affecting 
in any way the ability of any Party receiving service under the Tariff to exercise its rights 
under the Federal Power Act and pursuant to the Commission’s rules and regulations 
promulgated thereunder. 
 230. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343 (1956) (stating that 
rates fixed by contract may only be changed by mutual agreement). 
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their bilateral agreements a provision that would permit one or both parties to 
unilaterally establish a new rate that would supersede the existing contract rate—
i.e., a Memphis clause, in essence permitting the parties to “contract out of the 
Mobile-Sierra presumption.”231  The new rate would be subject to FPA section 
205(d)’s requirement that it be filed with FERC but can take effect without FERC 
action.232 
Two courts of appeals have identified another route by which two parties to a 
bilateral agreement can effectuate a rate change.233  Parties may include in their 
contracts a provision that would permit FERC to act pursuant to FPA section 
206(a) and set aside the existing rate if the rate is found not to be just and 
reasonable and replace it with a new rate.234  Such a provision is different from a 
Memphis clause, which permits the seller to take unilateral action to increase rates, 
subject only to FPA section 205’s filing requirements.235  Such rate changes are 
effected solely by virtue of the utility’s action and do not require a FERC order.236   
Unlike a Memphis clause, a provision permitting rate changes pursuant to FPA 
section 206 requires FERC action to permit any proposed rate changes.237  When 
the contract requires a FERC order, the parties “have bargained for and obtained a 
contractual authorization for a section 206(a) proceeding with its just and 
reasonable standard of proof.”238  The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption 
would not apply in this context because the parties contemplated that they would be 
permitted to seek rate changes.239  Because the rate change would be implemented 
                                                                                                     
 231. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 
534 (2008); Memphis, 358 U.S. at 110, 114-15; see also Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 723 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that one of the ways that rates may be 
revised under FPA sections 205 and 206 is for the parties to “agree that new rates can be unilaterally and 
immediately imposed by the utility, subject, under § 205, to [FERC] suspension for no longer than five 
months, and to ultimate [FERC] disallowance if they are not just and reasonable”). 
 232. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(d) (2010 & Supp. 2012).  
 233. See Papago, 723 F.2d at 953; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 587 F.2d 671, 675-76 (5th Cir. 1979).  One commenter has referred to Papago as one of a 
series of cases that belong to the “Middle Age of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine.”  Gentile, supra note 78, 
at 358-363. 
 234. Papago, 723 F.2d at 953; see Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 675-76.  The Supreme Court in 
Mobile similarly observed that there was nothing in section 206 to prevent a utility “from furnishing to 
[FERC] any relevant information and requesting it to initiate an investigation on its own motion.”  
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Servs.  Corp, 350 U.S., 332, at 344-45 (1956). 
 235. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 110, 114-15 
(1958); see Papago, 723 F.2d at 953-55; Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 675. 
 236. See Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 676 (citing Mobile, 350 U.S. at 342). 
 237. See Papago, 723 F.2d at 955 (citing Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 610 F.2d 914, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 675.  The contract 
provision at issue in the Papago cases stated that after a specified period of time, the rates would remain 
in effect “unless and until changed by [FERC], with either party hereto to be free unilaterally to take 
appropriate action before [FERC] in connection with changes which may be desired by such party.”  
Papago, 723 F.2d at 953.  In Louisiana Power, the provision stated that the agreements were “subject to 
amendment or alteration as a result of and in accordance with a valid applicable order of any 
governmental authority having jurisdiction hereof.”  Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 675. 
 238. Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 676. 
 239. See Papago, 723 F.2d at 954; Kansas Cities v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 723 F.2d 82, 
87-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Because the public interest presumption is “almost insurmountable,” “to assume 
that a contractual provision pertaining to rate adjustments” would incorporate that presumption would 
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pursuant to FPA section 206(a), the rate would only apply prospectively from the 
date of the FERC order.240 
Thus, the courts recognize that the entities regulated by FERC have established 
several options through which to contractually provide for changes to rates in 
existing bilateral agreements. “The rule of Sierra, Mobile and Memphis is 
refreshingly simple:  The contract between the parties governs the legality of the 
filing.  Rate filings consistent with contractual obligations are valid; rate filings 
inconsistent with contractual obligations are invalid.”241  
4.  Unilateral Rate Setting that Results in a Settlement:  A Mixed Case 
Utilities’ tariffs generally include Memphis clauses, permitting the utilities to 
unilaterally change rates set forth in the tariffs.  Similarly, if a bilateral agreement 
contains a Memphis clause, the utility may make a unilateral change to a rate set 
forth in that contract.  In both cases, the utility must comply with the notice 
provisions of FPA section 205(d).242   
The prevalence of unilateral rate setting has caused FERC and utility practice 
with respect to FPA section 205 to evolve over time.  The Supreme Court in Mobile 
characterized the FPA as not establishing a rate-changing procedure or a 
mechanism for initiating rate “proceedings.”243  FPA section 205 provides only for 
notice to FERC of the rates established by the public utility and for review by 
FERC of those rates.244  Notwithstanding Mobile’s straightforward analysis of FPA 
section 205, that section’s notice requirement and opportunity for review by FERC 
have become similar to the “traditional” unilateral rate-setting model,245 where 
public utilities “seek approval” from FERC in order to implement a proposed 
rate.246  FPA section 205 has been described as “the key pattern for much of 
                                                                                                     
be “to assume that it was intended to be virtually inoperative; whereas to interpret it as referring” to the 
just and reasonable standard without the application of the presumption “is to give it a content that is 
both substantial and fair to both sides.”). 
 240. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a) (2010 & Supp. 2012); Louisiana Power, 587 F.2d at 676. 
 241. Richmond Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 481 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see 
also Kyle, supra note 81, at 100 (stating that in Memphis, the Supreme Court held “that a contract 
between a seller and a buyer, and particularly a clear expression in a price provision therein, means 
exactly what it says”). 
 242. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(d) (2010 & Supp. 2012); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. 
Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339-40, 341-42 (1956) (noting that FPA section 205(d) is not a grant of power to 
utilities, but merely indicates that otherwise valid changes to a contract cannot go into effect without 
providing the required notice to FERC). 
 243. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 342.  Cf. Borough of Lansdale v. FPC, 494 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (stating that the purpose of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is “to subordinate the statutory filing 
mechanism to the broad and familiar dictates of contract law”). 
 244. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 342-43.   
 245. As the Court explained in Verizon, under “the classic scheme of administrative rate setting at the 
federal level,” the “regulated utility companies [would set out their rates] in proposed tariff schedules.”  
535 U.S. 467, 478 (2002).  Interested parties would have an opportunity to comment, and the tariffs 
would be accepted by the regulatory agency so long as the rates contained therein were reasonable and 
not unduly discriminatory.  Id. 
 246. Likely reflecting the change in practice resulting from the prevalence of unilateral rate setting, 
the D.C. Circuit has stated that “Section 205 of the [FPA] gives the utility the right to file rates and 
terms for services rendered with its assets.”  Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
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[FERC’s] regulation:  a public utility makes a proposed filing and [FERC] then acts 
to accept, reject, or modify the filing as necessary.”247 
When a utility’s unilateral rate filing is contested by interested parties, FERC 
will frequently give the utility and the parties the opportunity to come to an 
agreement, or settlement, resolving differences in their positions.  This article 
explains that when the utility and interested parties reach a settlement, through 
negotiation and bargaining, the rate they establish is a BFR.  FERC’s rate filing 
procedures and settlement practice are summarized below.  This article argues that 
because settlements are the result of negotiation and bargaining, the public interest 
presumption should automatically apply when a settlement is challenged.  An 
example of a unilateral rate filing resulting in a settlement is provided below, 
including an explanation of when and how the Mobile-Sierra public interest 
presumption would apply. 
a.  FERC’s Rate Filing Procedures 
FERC’s regulations implementing FPA section 205(c)248 and 205(d)249 are set 
forth at 18 C.F.R. Part 35.250  When a utility unilaterally submits a proposed rate 
increase to FERC, the utility initiates what is commonly referred to as a “rate 
case.”251  Consistent with FPA section 205(d), FERC’s regulations require 
proposed changes to be submitted to FERC not less than sixty days or more than 
120 days prior to the proposed effective date of the change.252  FERC may waive 
the notice requirement if the proponent has shown good cause.253  FERC’s 
regulations require that the utility include the rationale and support for the increase, 
and to enable FERC and its staff to evaluate the merits of the “proposed” rate.254  A 
utility may need to file up to thirty-eight different cost-of-service statements.255 
After the utility makes its initial rate case filing, FERC will assign a new 
                                                                                                     
295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  In Atlantic City Elec. Co., the court characterized FPA section 205’s 
filing requirement as a statutory right to file changes to rates given to public utilities by Congress.  Id.  
This characterization stands in stark contrast to Mobile’s pronouncement that section 205 bestowed no 
rights on utilities, but merely required utilities to provide notice of any rate change that they are 
permitted under their agreements to make.  See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339-40, 341-42. 
 247. MCGREW, supra note 25, at 21. 
 248. Section 205(c) requires effective rate schedules and contracts to be filed with FERC.  16 
U.S.C.A. § 824d(c) (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 249. Section 205(d) requires all changes in such schedules and contracts to be filed at least sixty days 
before the changes go into effect.  16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(d). 
 250. 18 C.F.R. § 35.1-35.47.  These regulations apply both to proposed changes to rates on file at 
FERC as well as to proposed revisions to non-rate terms and conditions of contracts and tariff 
provisions.   
 251. Part 35’s requirements also apply to the submission of BFRs to FERC pursuant to FPA section 
205(d). 
 252. 18 C.F.R. § 35.3(a). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.13. 
 255. Id. at § 35.13(h) (setting forth Statements AA through BM) (note that there is no Statement AZ).  
These Statements seek information relating to, among other things, earnings, labor, materials, operation 
and maintenance expenses, taxes, fuel, depreciation on plant, construction, interest costs for debt, and 
other costs.  Not all thirty-eight Statements will be appropriate for each rate case.  
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docket number to that filing and issue a “notice of filing.”256  In the notice of filing, 
FERC will establish a deadline—usually twenty-one days after the date of filing—
for interested parties to submit protests and motions to intervene in the docketed 
proceeding.257  Through protests, interested parties, such as customers or state 
commissions, may set forth their objections to the rate change proposed by the 
utility.  If no party protests a proposed rate change, FERC is more likely to permit 
the proposed change to become effective on the proposed effective date.258  This 
practice is consistent with the traditional understanding of FPA section 205 
expressed in Mobile, that section 205 is not a rate-change mechanism, but that 
otherwise valid rate changes can go into effect so long as the proponent provides 
the required notice to FERC and FERC has the opportunity to review the changed 
rate.259 
Although FERC may reject a filing “which patently fails to substantially 
comply” with FERC’s Part 35 requirements,260 FERC generally will issue an order 
permitting the proposed rate to become effective on the date requested, or 
suspending the filing (for up to five months) and permitting it to become effective 
subject to refund.261  The purpose of a suspension is to allow FERC to resolve 
issues of fact and to determine whether the proposed rate is just and reasonable, or 
what a just and reasonable rate would be.262  If the proposed rate is suspended, it is 
generally set for hearing—a trial-type proceeding—before an ALJ.263 
b.  Settlement Practice at FERC 
The settlement practice has been used by FERC to assist in managing its 
                                                                                                     
 256. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 182. 
 257. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.8.  The regulation establishes a period of twenty-one days as the default 
period during which an interested party may file a protest. 
 258. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 182. 
 259. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339-40, 41-42 (1956).  
FERC’s regulations state that the fact that a rate goes into effect does not necessarily constitute 
“approval” by FERC of such rate.  18 C.F.R. § 35.4. 
 260. 18 C.F.R. § 35.5(a).  A rate filing should only be rejected if it “patently is either deficient in 
form or a substantive nullity.”  Municipal Light Boards v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  
Rejection of a filing is appropriate “where the filing is so deficient on its face that the agency may 
properly return it to the filing party without even awaiting a responsive filing by any other party in 
interest.”  Id. at 1346. 
 261. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 32.  Where FERC’s preliminary analysis indicates that the 
proposed rates may be unjust and unreasonable, and may be substantially excessive, FERC will 
generally impose a five-month suspension under FPA section 205.  See W. Tex. Utils. Co., 18 FERC ¶ 
61,189 (1982).  If a rate is permitted to become effective “subject to refund,” the utility is permitted to 
collect the proposed rate while the hearing takes place.  Id.  When the hearing is concluded, and FERC 
has determined a just and reasonable rate, the utility must refund the difference between the rate that 
was collected and the just and reasonable rate.  Id. 
 262. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(e) (2010 & Supp. 2012).  In such situations, FERC typically will find 
that aspects of the proposed rate change cannot be resolved based on the record before it—i.e., the 
materials submitted by the proponent of the rate change and any protests thereto—and are more 
appropriately addressed in a hearing before an ALJ.  See, e.g., PacifiCorp, 137 FERC ¶ 61,247 at P 18 
(Dec. 30, 2011). 
 263. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 32, 183.   
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voluminous case load.264  Because FERC hearings can be time consuming and 
expensive, parties often resolve the issues set for hearing by settlement.265  FERC 
and the courts have determined that settlements are in the public interest because 
they provide for “voluntary, self-imposed resolutions” of issues that have been set 
for hearing.266   In dockets where FERC has set issues for hearing, it is common 
practice for FERC to hold the hearing in abeyance and direct the parties to engage 
in settlement discussions aided by the appointment of a settlement judge.267   
Parties may submit an offer of settlement at any time,268 but settlements must 
be submitted to and approved by FERC in order to take effect.  After an offer of 
settlement is submitted to FERC, all participants in the docketed proceeding have 
the opportunity to file comments and reply comments on the settlement offer.269  
Given the inherent nature of compromise involved in a settlement, a settlement 
offer may be considered a “black box” in which the settling parties agree to settle 
the case without specifying a rate of return.270  If the offer of settlement is 
uncontested, FERC will approve the settlement if it is fair and reasonable and in the 
public interest.271  Generally, if the settlement is uncontested, there are few 
procedural obstacles in the path to FERC approval.272 
Settlements are reached through negotiation and bargaining, and the customers 
who join the settlement have agreed to the rate set forth in the settlement 
agreement.273  As such, the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption applies to 
                                                                                                     
 264. See Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 306 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1962).  
FERC relies on its informal settlement procedure to resolve most of its rate cases.  See, e.g., Littlechild, 
supra note 9, at 2, 32.  Professor Littlechild provides a detailed account of how the settlement process at 
FERC operates in practice with respect to natural gas pipeline rate cases.  Another article has used a 
theoretical model and empirical data from natural gas cases to examine three issues:  (1) how the 
settlement process is different from the formal adjudicatory process; (2) how settlement outcomes are 
different from outcomes in litigation; and (3) why participants settle rate cases.  Zhongmin Wang, 
Settling Utility Rate Cases:  An Alternative Ratemaking Procedure, 26 J. OF REG. ECON. 141 (2004). 
 265. See Pa. Gas & Water Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 463 F.2d 1242, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting 
that the purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act’s informal settlement provision, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c), 
“is to eliminate the need for often costly and lengthy formal hearings in those cases where the parties are 
able to reach a result of their own which the appropriate agency finds compatible with the public 
interest”); MCGREW, supra note 25, at 35. 
 266. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 36. 
 267. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.603 (2012). 
 268. Id. § 385.602. 
 269. Id. § 385.602(f). 
 270. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 104; Littlechild, supra note 9, at 17; Wang, supra note 264, at 
150. 
 271. 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(g). 
 272. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 36. 
 273. See United Mun. Distribs. Grp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 732 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (characterizing approval of a settlement “allowing [the settling parties] to have the benefit of 
their bargain”); see also Littlechild, supra note 9, at 17-19 (describing the settlement procedure as a 
negotiation process), 32 (stating that FERC’s “regulatory aim is to bring the parties into agreement, not 
to impose a preconceived settlement upon them” and “to facilitate the market process, not to replace 
it”); Wang, supra note 264, at 156, 161 (explaining that “[t]he settlement process is clearly a bargaining 
game” and that consenting parties to a settlement may “reap the benefits of their bargain”).  Cf. 
McCaffrey, supra note 98, at 78-80 (noting that it can be argued that FERC should not “reject a 
settlement agreement negotiated by sophisticated parties to govern jurisdictional rates, terms and 
conditions”). 
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issues that are resolved through settlement.274  As discussed above in Part II, 
bargaining between parties is the hallmark of rates to which the public interest 
presumption must apply.  Although proceedings to change rates may have 
commenced through a unilateral filing by a utility, the resolution through 
settlement transforms the unilateral rate “proposal” into a BFR.275      
Settlements need not be unanimous and may be contested by participants of 
the proceeding.276  If the offer of settlement is contested, FERC may decide the 
merits of the contested issues if it determines that the record is adequately 
developed to do so.277  If the record is not adequate to make a determination on the 
                                                                                                     
 274. See Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.3d 845, 853-56 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that FERC was not permitted to modify the terms of a settlement agreement 
because the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption was not overcome); Maine PUC I, supra note 19, 
at 476 (stating that “when the parties to a rate dispute reach a contractual settlement, FERC must enforce 
the terms of the bargain unless the public interest requires otherwise”); Union Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 890 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine’s pro-contract policy “encompasses settlement agreements”); Cities of Newark v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n 763 F.2d 533, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the “policies underlying the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine apply with equal force to settlement agreements”); Cities of Bethany v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he policies . . . in Mobile and 
Sierra support treating a settlement agreement” as permissible under FPA section 205(b)’s anti-
discrimination requirement, even when other participants do not agree to the settlement and pay 
different rates).  Cf. Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 444 (“[I]f a settlement package includes a 
fixed-rate contract or provides that the settling parties will execute a fixed-rate contract upon approval 
of the settlement, then the contract rate results directly from the provisions of the settlement.”). 
 275. It has been suggested that “negotiated settlements have generally led to better information flows 
and understanding in the industry, and to better relationships between the company and customers.” 
Littlechild, supra note 9, at 24.  
 276. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h).  A key difference between settlements in administrative 
proceedings and those in civil litigation is that a settlement “do[es] not have to be consented to by all 
parties to the [administrative] proceeding, and if settlements are found to be ‘equitable by the regulatory 
agency, then the terms of the settlement form the substance of an order binding on all parties, even 
though not all are in accord as to the result.’”  Mary Ann Walker, Settlement Practice at the FERC:  
Boom or Bane, 7 ENERGY L. J. 343, 344 (1986) (quoting Pa. Gas & Water Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
463 F.2d 1242, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  Some commenters have argued that regulatory commissions 
should not accept contested or non-unanimous settlements.  See, e.g., Stefan H. Krieger, Problems for 
Captive Ratepayers in Nonunanimous Settlements of Public Utility Rate Cases, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 257 
(1995).  But see Alan P. Buchmann & Robert S. Tongren, Nonunanimous Settlements of Public Utility 
Rate Cases:  A Response, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 337 (1996) (arguing that requiring unanimous settlements 
is neither necessary nor conducive to reasonable regulation).  Other observers suggest that contested, or 
non-unanimous, settlements are abnormal, and that the uncertainty about the outcome and the cost and 
burden of carrying a case alone may make contested settlements unattractive to objecting parties.  See 
Littlechild, supra note 9, at 19. 
 277. 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h); see Pa. Gas & Water Co., 463 F.2d at 1247-52 (finding that FERC may 
approve a non-unanimous rate settlement proposal and terminate proceedings over the objection of a 
participant in the proceeding).  In Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 85 FERC ¶ 61,345 (1998), order on reh’g, 
87 FERC ¶ 61,110 (1999), FERC explained the standards it would use to rule on contested offers of 
settlement.  If FERC concludes that a contested settlement provides an acceptable outcome for a case, it 
must next determine which of four approaches it will employ to address each of the contested issues on 
the merits:  (1) FERC shall render a binding merits decision on each contested issue; (2) FERC shall 
approve the settlement based on a finding that the overall settlement as a package is just and reasonable; 
(3) FERC shall determine that the benefits of the settlement outweigh the nature of the objections, and 
the interests of the contesting party are too attenuated; or (4) FERC shall approve the settlement as 
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merits of a contested issue, FERC may provide for a limited hearing to supplement 
the record so that FERC may make such findings on the merits.278  FERC may 
choose to sever contested issues or contesting parties, approving the uncontested 
portion of the settlement or approving the settlement as between consenting parties, 
if it finds it appropriate to do so.279  However, most offers of settlement contain 
“non-severability” clauses, which require that the offer of settlement be approved 
as a package and that issues may not be severed.280   
A settlement may be reached among all or some of the participants to the 
proceeding and may resolve all or some of the issues between the parties.  FERC 
may impose aspects of a non-unanimous settlement on participants that contested 
the settlement.281  The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply 
when an issue resolved by the settlement is challenged,282 but not when an aspect of 
the settlement that was imposed on a contesting participant is challenged.  This 
may be administratively inconvenient—where the public interest presumption 
would apply to a challenge to rates paid by settlement parties, but would not apply 
to a challenge to identical rates paid by a contesting participant.  However, it 
recognizes that the parties to a settlement successfully negotiated and agreed to the 
rates and issues set forth in the settlement agreement, but that a participant 
contesting part (or all) of a settlement did not.  It is also consistent with FERC’s 
practice of severing contesting parties in order to effectuate a settlement among the 
consenting parties.283  Courts of appeals have approved this practice, even though it 
results in participants to the same proceeding paying different rates.284  Where a 
rate proceeding may result in participants paying different rates (because FERC 
may approve a settlement for parties consenting to the settlement agreement, but 
contesting participants would pay an administratively determined rate), it follows 
                                                                                                     
uncontested for the consenting parties, and sever the contesting parties to allow them to litigate the 
issues raised.  Id. 
 278. 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h). 
 279. Id.; see United Mun. Distribs. Group. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n , 732 F.2d 202, 204-
05, 207-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding FERC’s decision, United Gas Pipe Line Co., 22 FERC ¶ 61,094, 
order on reh’g, 23 FERC ¶ 61,101 (1983), to approve a settlement as to all parties except the contesting 
party and to direct a full evidentiary hearing on the question of the contesting party’s rates).  Cf. Wang, 
supra note 264, at 161 (concluding that FERC’s policy of approving a settlement as uncontested for 
consenting parties and severing contesting parties to litigate a rate case is more practical than adopting a 
unanimity requirement). 
 280. See Walker, supra note 276 at 353; Wang, supra note 264, at 150. 
 281. 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h); Pa. Gas & Water Co., 463 F.2d at 1247-52. 
 282. See Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.3d 845, 853-56 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 890 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Cities of Newark v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n 763 F.2d 533, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
727 F.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 283. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h). 
 284. See United Mun. Distribs. Grp., 732 F.2d at 204-05, 207-12; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-
47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 1139.  In Cities of Newark and Cities of Bethany, the Third Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit, respectively, determined that rate disparities between customers as a result of a 
settlement with some customers are permissible and are not unlawfully discriminatory under FPA 
section 205(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(b) (2010 & Supp. 2012).  The Third Circuit noted in Cities of 
Newark that there may be tension between FPA section 205(b)’s anti-discrimination mandate, and “the 
pro-settlement bias of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.”  763 F.2d at 546. 
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that there may be differing applications of the just and reasonable standard when 
rates established through a settlement are challenged.  This is because the Mobile-
Sierra public interest presumption would apply when rates paid by settling parties 
are challenged, but not when the rates paid by participants on whom the settlement 
rates were imposed by FERC are challenged. 
c.  Examples 
Some examples may help to illustrate these principles.  Suppose that Utility 
Co. has an electric tariff on file with FERC.  The tariff contains three rate schedules 
for different electric services:  Rates Schedules A, B, and C.  Utility Co.’s tariff 
includes a Memphis clause, permitting Utility Co. to make unilateral rate changes 
to the rates set forth in Rate Schedules A, B, and C.  Utility Co. does so, and 
submits the proposed rates to FERC on January 2, 2011, requesting an effective 
date of March 3, 2011—sixty days later.  After FERC issues a notice of filing, 
wholesale customers of Utility Co.—W, X, and Y—file motions to intervene and 
protests to the proposed rate increases.285  Z, a retail customer of W, also files a 
motion to intervene and protest.  State Utility Commission intervenes and protests 
as well.  FERC issues an order accepting the rates subject to refund, but suspending 
the effectiveness of the proposed rates for five months—until August 3, 2011—and 
instituting hearing procedures to investigate the justness and reasonableness of the 
proposed changes to the rates.  However, FERC holds the hearing in abeyance and 
directs the parties to engage in settlement discussions. 
After months of negotiations and bargaining, Utility Co. submits an offer of 
settlement to FERC with respect to Rate Schedules A and B.  For Rate Schedule A, 
all parties—Utility Co., W, X, Y, Z, and State Utility Commission—have 
compromised and agreed to a smaller increase in the rate than proposed by Utility 
Co.  For Rate Schedule B, Utility Co. has reached an agreement with W, X, and Z 
for a smaller rate increase than that originally proposed; however, Y and State 
Utility Commission object to the amount of the increase and do not join the 
settlement agreement with respect to Rate Schedule B.  The settlement agreement 
stipulates that Utility Co. will not seek a rate increase with respect to Rate 
Schedules A and B for a period of five years after the effectiveness of the 
settlement rates286—that is, August 3, 2016.  However, Utility Co. will be 
permitted to unilaterally seek a rate increase that may take effect no earlier than 
August 3, 2016.  In addition, the settlement agreement states that the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption shall apply to any challenges to, or attempts to change, the rates for 
Rate Schedules A and B during the five year rate moratorium.  Finally, no 
agreement is reached with respect to Rate Schedule C.   
After the offer of settlement is presented to FERC,287 FERC issues an order 
                                                                                                     
 285. Each of W, X, and Y have executed individual service agreements under Utility Co.’s tariff.   
 286. One commenter has observed that “[i]t is remarkable that rate moratorium, a simple form of 
price cap regulation, arises endogenously from the settlement process of the traditional” rate cases.  
Wang, supra note 264, at 142.  Although FERC is prohibited by the FPA and NGA from imposing a 
rate moratorium on the regulated utilities and pipelines, it “is free and willing to approve settlements 
with rate moratoria.”  Id. 
 287. When settlement discussions are before an ALJ, FERC’s Rules of Practice and Procedure call 
for the ALJ to certify an offer of settlement to FERC.  If, after comments are submitted on the offer of 
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finding that the rates for Rate Schedules A and B are fair and reasonable and in the 
public interest, notwithstanding the objections by Y and State Utility Commission 
with respect to Rate Schedule B.288  Therefore, the rates set forth in the settlement 
agreement for Rate Schedules A and B take effect on the date contemplated by the 
five-month suspension—that is, August 3, 2011.  FERC sets Rate Schedule C for 
hearing, and the parties proceed with trial-type hearing procedures before an ALJ 
to determine a just and reasonable rate.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ 
determines that a rate increase is appropriate, but that the increase should be 
smaller than that proposed by Utility Co.289  In a subsequent order, FERC approves 
of the ALJ’s findings, and the new rate for Rate Schedule C goes into effect on 
August 3, 2011. 
Suppose further that in July 2013, Utility Co. decides to seek a higher rate for 
services provided under Rate Schedule A and submits a proposed rate increase to 
FERC on July 15, 2013.  FERC issues an order finding that Utility Co.’s rate filing 
is a legal nullity.290  The rate for Rate Schedule A constitutes a BFR, agreed to in 
the settlement by Utility Co. and all interested parties.291  Therefore, Utility Co. and 
the parties only possess the rights that are enumerated in the settlement agreement 
with respect to Rate Schedule A.292  Utility Co.’s July 15 filing is similar to the 
proposed rate increase in Mobile, because Utility Co. does not have authority under 
the settlement agreement to unilaterally change the rate until August 3, 2016.293  
Because the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption applies to Utility Co.’s 
proposed rate change, FERC may only permit the rate to be changed (prior to 
                                                                                                     
settlement, the ALJ determines that the settlement is uncontested, the ALJ shall certify to FERC that the 
offer of settlement is uncontested.  See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(g)(1).  An uncontested offer of settlement 
may be approved by FERC upon a finding that the settlement appears to be fair and reasonable and in 
the public interest.  See id. § 385.602(g)(3).  If the ALJ determines that the offer of settlement is 
contested, either in whole or in part, the ALJ may certify all or part of the offer to FERC.  See id. § 
385.602(h)(2).  If any part of the settlement is contested, it may be certified to FERC only if:  (1) there 
are no genuine issues of material fact; or (2) the parties concur that the ALJ may omit preparation of an 
initial decision, and the record contains substantial evidence from which FERC may reach a reasoned 
decision on the merits of the contested issue.  See id.  
 288. See Pennsylvania. Gas & Water Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 463 F.2d 1242, 1247-52 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (finding that FERC may approve a rate settlement proposal and terminate proceedings over the 
objection of a participant in the proceeding, so long as there are no questions of material fact).  In this 
situation, the ALJ could have certified as uncontested the offer of settlement as it relates to the rates in 
Rate Schedule A, severed from the contested offer of settlement with respect to Rate Schedule B.  See 
18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h)(2)(iv). 
 289. Subject to certain exceptions, at the conclusion of a hearing the ALJ who presides over the 
hearing shall prepare a written initial decision, which shall be certified to FERC with a copy of the 
record from the hearing.  Id. at § 385.708.  
 290. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 347 (1956); Mun. Light 
Boards v. Fed. Power Comm’n  450 F.2d 1341, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing the Court in Mobile 
as rejecting United’s rate filing as a nullity because United “had sought unilaterally to change a rate set 
by contract”). 
 291. See Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 533 F.3d 845, 853-56 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008); Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
890 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Cities of Newark v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 763 
F.2d 533, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1131, 
1139 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 292. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343-44, 347. 
 293. See id. at 347. 
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August 3, 2016) if the change is required by the public interest.294  FERC rejects 
the proposed change to the rate.295 
Suppose that the following year, X and Y file complaints at FERC against 
Utility Co., alleging that the rates in Rate Schedule B are excessive.  State Utility 
Commission believes that the rates paid by W under Rate Schedule B, some of 
which are passed on in retail rates to W’s retail customer Z, are too high, resulting 
in excessive retail rates collected by W from Z.  State Utility Commission also files 
a complaint with FERC against Utility Co., arguing that W is paying too much 
under Rate Schedule B.  FERC consolidates all of these complaint proceedings 
because all complainants are challenging the rates in Rate Schedule B.  In the 
consolidated proceedings, FERC must first determine whether the Mobile-Sierra 
public interest presumption automatically applies.  
The public interest presumption must apply to the challenge made by X 
because X’s rate is a BFR.  The rate paid by X to Utility Co. is a BFR because 
Utility Co. and X agreed to that rate in the settlement agreement; therefore, FERC 
must apply the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption to the challenge by X.296 
Although the public interest presumption must apply to the challenge made by 
X, that is not the case with respect to the challenge made by Y.   Y did not agree to 
the rate set forth in the settlement agreement for Rate Schedule B.  Therefore, the 
rate paid by Y cannot be considered a BFR (even though it is the same rate paid by 
X).  Because Y’s rate is not a BFR, FERC would not automatically apply the public 
interest presumption to the challenge made by Y. 
There may appear to be a conundrum:  both X and Y pay the same rate under 
Rate Schedule B, yet X’s rate is a BFR and Y’s rate is not.  However, this outcome 
is consistent with the principles underlying the Mobile-Sierra presumption—
namely, that parties who have negotiated and agreed to a rate are bound to it.  A 
BFR is established when both parties mutually agree to the rate, as when X and 
Utility Co. joined the settlement agreement,297 and X bargained away the right to 
challenge its rate under Rate Schedule B prior to August 3, 2016.  However, Y 
struck no such bargain and should not be bound by a contract term to which it did 
not agree.  This may be administratively inconvenient for FERC, but it recognizes 
that each of a utility company’s customers, including customers taking service 
pursuant to a tariff, have separate contractual agreements with the utility.298      
In the case of the complaint filed by State Utility Commission, FERC must 
apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption to that challenge.  Although State Utility 
                                                                                                     
 294. See id. at 345; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).  
Sierra’s three-pronged inquiry is set forth supra, at note 115. 
 295. The rate set forth in the settlement agreement remained the only lawful rate.  See Mobile, 350 
U.S. at 347. 
 296. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union 
Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 
1139. 
 297. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56. 
 298. In a similar fashion, FERC has approved settlements among non-contesting parties while 
directing administrative hearings to determine the rate that would be paid by parties that did not join the 
settlement agreement.  See United Gas Pipe Line Co., 22 FERC ¶ 61,094, order on reh’g, 23 FERC ¶ 
61,101 (1983), aff’d sub nom. United Mun. Distribs. Group. v.Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 732 
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Potomac Edison Co., 17 FERC ¶ 61,167 (1981). 
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Commission did not join the settlement with respect to Rate Schedule B, State 
Utility Commission is not a customer of Utility Co. under Rate Schedule B.  
Therefore, State Utility Commission cannot argue that it is paying excessive rates 
under Rate Schedule B.  Instead, State Utility Commission’s complaint argues that 
the rates paid by W for service under Rate Schedule B are too high, in turn, 
resulting in excessive retail rates paid by Z to W.  In NRG, the Supreme Court 
determined that the application of the public interest presumption does not depend 
on the identity of the challenger.299  In this example, the Mobile-Sierra presumption 
would apply to State Utility Commission’s challenge of W’s rate because W was a 
party to the settlement agreement.300  Therefore, under NRG, FERC and State 
Utility Commission must presume that W’s rate is just and reasonable because W’s 
rate is the result of negotiations that ended in settlement.301 
C.  Addressing NRG’s Issues on Remand 
On remand, FERC was directed to determine whether the FCM auction market 
clearing prices should be considered “contract rates” (or BFRs) to which the 
Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption must apply.302  And, if not, FERC was 
also directed to answer whether it possesses the discretion to apply the Mobile-
Sierra presumption to such rates.303  FERC determined that the rates were not 
BFRs.304  Nonetheless, FERC believed that it “has discretion to consider and decide 
whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more rigorous 
application of the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review.”305   
FERC’s finding as to the first question was in error.  The FCM auction 
produces BFRs.  A BFR results from freely negotiated contracts,306 including 
settlement agreements.307  The ISO-NE’s FCM is a unique creation that does not fit 
squarely within the traditional seller-purchaser contractual rubric.  However, the 
                                                                                                     
 299. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, ___, 130 S. Ct. 693, 
696-97, 701 (2010). 
 300. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union 
Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 
1139. 
 301. See NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 700; Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; 
Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d 
at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 1139. 
 302. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. 701; Maine PUC II, supra note 161, at 759-60. As noted 
above, see supra note 144, the rates at issue in NRG also included the transition payments. 
 303. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 701. 
 304. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 13-14, 19 (2011); Devon Power LLC, 137 
FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 21-28 (2011).  Cf. Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 445 n.89 (noting that 
there was “considerable disagreement about whether the [FCM] auctions at issue in NRG resulted in 
contract rates”). 
 305. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 14-17 (quoted language at P 2). 
 306. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 
530 (2008). 
 307. See Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.3d 845, 853-56 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n  v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 520 F.3d 464, 476 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Union Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 890 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989); Cities of Newark v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 763 F.2d 533, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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principles outlined above can be used to determine the appropriate resolution to the 
Supreme Court’s questions in NRG. 
The FCM auction mechanism was set forth in the Settlement Agreement, 
which was agreed to by 107 of 115 participants in the Devon Power proceeding.308  
The Settlement Agreement was reached through painstaking negotiation and 
bargaining, and the settling parties agreed to the use of the auction mechanism to 
determine the price for capacity.309  The results of the annual auctions are akin to 
the prices produced through the application of “formula rates.”  With a formula 
rate, “the formula itself is the rate.”310  As a utility’s costs fluctuate over time, the 
costs can be plugged in to the formula to derive the resulting rate charged to 
customers.  When FERC approves a formula rate, it is approving the formula, not 
the utility’s inputs into the formula or the charges resulting from the application of 
the inputs into the formula.311  One court of appeals has stated that a formula rate in 
a bilateral contract  
functions in many respects as a cost-of-service tariff.  Rather than specifying a 
rate, it elucidates a formula for calculating a rate.  The formula uses cost variables, 
or categories of costs, to measure most components . . . .  As the utility’s costs in 
each of these categories fluctuate, its charges vary proportionately, without the 
need for a rate change filing [pursuant to FPA section 205].312 
As with a traditional formula rate, the Settlement Agreement in Devon Power 
and the ISO-NE tariff did not state what the auction clearing prices would be; 
rather, the Settlement Agreement established the FCM, under which the ISO-NE 
holds annual price-setting auctions for capacity.313  The individual auction 
processes provide the inputs to the “formula” that result in the market clearing 
prices, i.e., the rates.  Just as with formula rates, approval by FERC of the 
Settlement Agreement permitted the auction mechanism to go into effect. 
The auction mechanism was established through a settlement that was reached 
by 107 parties in Devon Power.314  As such, the FCM’s auction process and the 
prices it produces constitute BFRs for those 107 parties.315  The Mobile-Sierra 
public interest presumption should apply to challenges to capacity prices derived 
from FCM auctions paid by the 107 settling parties.316   
With respect to the rates paid by the eight parties that did not join the 
settlement in Devon Power (if they are electric utilities that need to acquire 
                                                                                                     
 308. Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,306 (2006). 
 309. Id. 
 310. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 185. 
 311. See id. at 186. 
 312. Boston Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 856 F.2d 361, 366 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(citation to contract omitted). 
 313. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,304, 62,306-08. 
 314. Id. at 62,306. 
 315. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union 
Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 
1139.  But cf. Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 447 (suggesting that the FCM auction rates are 
not BFRs because they are not traditional fixed-rate contracts). 
 316. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union 
Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 
1139.  
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capacity), the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption would not (automatically) 
apply to challenges to their rates.  Purchasers that did not join the Settlement 
Agreement must pay a price for capacity that was not the result of those 
purchasers’ negotiations and assent.  Therefore, the FCM auction mechanism and 
the resulting prices are not BFRs with respect to those purchasers.  
It should be noted that if the challenger is not a capacity purchaser—for 
example, a state utility commission—the challenge is, inherently, to the price paid 
by some purchaser for capacity.  As NRG made clear, application of the 
presumption does not depend on the identity of the challenger.317  Rather, the 
inquiry turns on the nature of the agreement challenged.  If a state utility 
commission challenges the price for capacity paid by a purchaser who was a party 
to the Settlement Agreement, then FERC should presume that the purchaser’s rate 
was just and reasonable because the rate and the auction mechanism that led to the 
rate were the result of fair negotiations and voluntary agreement.318  If the 
challenge is to a price paid by a purchaser that was not a party to the Settlement 
Agreement, the public interest presumption would not automatically apply. 
FERC’s orders on remand did not consider that the Settlement Agreement 
imbues the auction rates with the characteristics of BFRs.  Instead, FERC focused 
on the FCM auction itself, finding that it produced rates that are “determined 
unilaterally by the ISO-NE tariff” because the ISO-NE assesses the purchasing 
utilities their respective capacity charges based on the FCM auction’s market 
clearing prices.319  FERC ignored the role of the settling parties in establishing the 
FCM.  Although the ISO-NE’s role in assessing capacity charges is set forth in the 
ISO-NE’s tariff, it does not necessarily follow that the capacity charges constitute 
unilateral rates.  When a utility offers services under a traditional tariff, the utility 
assesses charges to its customers.  However, as explained above, not every rate set 
forth in a tariff is a unilateral rate.  When a rate is the result of a successful 
settlement—that is, negotiation, bargaining, and mutual agreement—the rate is a 
BFR.320  In Devon Power, 107 parties agreed to the FCM and its auction 
mechanism.321  Therefore, the capacity charges that result from the FCM’s auction 
paid by those 107 parties are BFRs.322 
In the order addressing requests for rehearing, FERC noted that “ISO-NE’s 
tariff does not create a contractual obligation by buyers to purchase capacity from 
                                                                                                     
 317. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, ___ 130 S. Ct. 693, 696-97, 
701 (2010). 
 318. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union 
Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 
1139. 
 319. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 13 (2011); Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 
61,073, at P 21-22 (2011). 
 320. See Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union 
Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 
1139. 
 321. Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,306 (2006). 
 322. For the participants that did not agree to the settlement, FERC is correct that the rates should not 
be considered BFRs.  See Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 13; Devon Power LLC, 137 
FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 25.   
2012] BARGAINING FOR POWER 141 
sellers of that capacity.”323  This does not mean that the capacity charges are 
unilateral rates.  With an ordinary tariff, the existence of the tariff does not obligate 
any entity to become a customer of the utility or to take particular services or 
purchase particular quantities.  However, if a customer purchases a product or 
service offered through a tariff, the customer is obligated to pay the price set forth 
in the tariff.  Here, utilities in New England must procure certain quantities of 
capacity.324  If the utilities do not self-supply the capacity or procure it from 
another source, they must purchase capacity through the FCM.325  Although the 
auctions do not create an obligation for the utilities to purchase, the auctions set the 
prices for utilities purchasing capacity through the FCM.  If the utilities purchase 
capacity through the FCM, they are obligated to pay the price set through the 
auction process, just as a customer under a traditional tariff is obligated to pay the 
rate set forth in the tariff or the rate derived through a formula set forth in the tariff.  
Whether the rates are BFRs turns on whether the rate was the result of purely 
unilateral rate setting or through negotiations and bargaining. 
Turning to the second question on remand, FERC was directed to answer, if 
the FCM auction rates were not BFRs, whether FERC “ha[s] discretion to treat 
them analogously” to BFRs.326  FERC stated that it “has discretion to consider and 
decide whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more 
rigorous application of the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review” and 
that future challenges to the FCM’s auction prices would be subject to a “more 
rigorous application.”327  In reaching this decision, FERC relied on the fact that the 
rates resulting from the FCM auctions would have certain market-based 
characteristics, similar to freely-negotiated contracts to which the Mobile-Sierra 
public interest presumption must apply.328  FERC also noted that a more rigorous 
application of the just and reasonable standard would promote rate stability, an 
important issue because of the variable nature of capacity revenues and the effect 
of that instability on generating units in New England.329 
It should first be noted that, had FERC answered the first remanded question 
properly, it would not have needed to address the second remanded question with 
respect to the rates paid by the 107 parties to the Settlement Agreement because 
challenges to those rates should be automatically subject to the Mobile-Sierra 
public interest presumption.  However, the question remains whether a more 
stringent application of the just and reasonable standard—such as the public 
interest presumption—can and should be applied to challenges to the rates paid by 
non-settling parties.   
FERC’s affirmative answer may be considered both incorrect and premature.  
                                                                                                     
 323. Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 24.   
 324. See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,304. 
 325. See id. at 62,307; see also Maine PUC  I, 520 F.3d at 469; NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, ___, 130 S. Ct. 693, 697 (2010). 
 326. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 701; Maine PUC II, supra note 161, at 759-60 (directing 
FERC to answer “why, if the auction rates are not [BFRs], they are entitled to Mobile-Sierra 
treatment”). 
 327. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 14-17 (quoted language at P 2). 
 328. Id. at P 19; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 32.   
 329. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 20. 
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FERC was incorrect insofar as it purported to determine that a more rigorous 
application of the just and reasonable standard will automatically apply to future 
challenges to the rates paid by non-settling parties.330  The automatic application of 
the Mobile-Sierra public interest standard to BFRs is appropriate because it 
respects the intent of the parties that negotiated the agreement.331  However, where 
the challenged rate is not a BFR, as would be the case for rates paid by the non-
settling parties in Devon Power, the rationale underlying the application of the 
Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption does not apply.332  In Devon Power, the 
non-settling participants did not agree to the FCM auction, and did not agree to the 
application of the public interest presumption to challenges to their rates.  In 
essence, FERC is attempting to bind the non-settling participants to the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement.  In this way, FERC’s response to the Supreme Court’s 
second remand question may be considered to be incorrect. 
FERC’s response is also premature because FERC should determine whether a 
“more rigorous” application of the just and reasonable standard should apply to a 
challenge of an FCM auction rate paid by a non-settling participant at the time such 
a challenge is brought.  Although FERC is correct that the FPA does not directly 
address how the “just and reasonable” standard should be applied or implemented 
in any particular context,333 FERC can better determine at the time the challenge is 
made whether a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard is 
appropriate.  In the orders on remand, FERC has offered reasons why it believes 
that challenges to the FCM auction results should be subject to application of the 
public interest presumption, including challenges to rates paid by non-settling 
parties.334  There may be situations in which it is appropriate for FERC to apply a 
presumption to challenges of rates that are not BFRs; however, an examination of 
the possible application of the public interest presumption outside of the BFR 
context is beyond the scope of this article.335  Because the auction rates paid by 
non-settling participants are not BFRs and application of a presumption would not 
                                                                                                     
 330. See id. at P 17-25.  It is not clear whether FERC considers the more rigorous application of the 
just and reasonable standard that would be applied in FERC’s discretion to be Mobile-Sierra’s “public 
interest” presumption, or a different (yet similar) application.  One set of commenters believes that 
FERC has drawn distinctions between the public interest presumption and the new discretionary 
application.  Cf. Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 451-52. 
 331. FERC believed that the Settlement Agreement might not have been reached without the 
inclusion of the public interest presumption in section 4.C.  Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
35.  This purported rationale should be inapposite because the FCM auction produces BFRs for the 
parties to the Settlement Agreement; as such, the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption would apply 
automatically to challenges, regardless of whether a Mobile-Sierra clause was included in the Settlement 
Agreement.  
 332. See Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at 62,048 (Norris, dissenting in part) (“[It is not] 
reasonable to . . . apply the more stringent public interest form of the just and reasonable standard 
dictated by the [public interest] presumption to situations where a contract [or BFR] is not present.”). 
 333. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 15; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 
30. 
 334. FERC stated that the FCM auction rates would be presumed to be just and reasonable because 
the rates would share certain market-based characteristics with freely-negotiated contracts.  Devon 
Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 19; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 32.   
 335. For a more expansive discussion of FERC’s authority to apply a more rigorous application of 
the just and reasonable standard, see Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 446-58. 
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be based on the negotiations and bargaining of the parties, FERC should not have 
determined in advance whether a presumption shall apply to future challenges of 
those rates.  In this regard, FERC’s answer to the second remanded question may 
be considered premature.   
V.  PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FERC’S ORDERS ON  
REMAND IN DEVON POWER LLC 
It may at first appear that there is little practical difference between FERC’s 
resolution of the issues remanded by the Supreme Court and the proposed 
resolution of those issues put forth by this article.  In Devon Power, FERC found 
that even though the FCM auction rates were not BFRs (or “contract rates”), FERC 
could exercise its discretion to approve a settlement provision that would impose 
the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption on future challenges to the auction 
results.336  On the other hand, this article has explained that, for the parties to the 
Settlement Agreement, the auction results are BFRs and the Mobile-Sierra public 
interest presumption should apply to challenges to the rates paid by the 107 settling 
parties;337 however, the public interest presumption would not automatically apply 
to challenges to the rates paid by the eight participants that objected to the 
Settlement Agreement.  Thus, with respect to the participants in the Devon Power 
proceeding, FERC and this article agree that the Mobile-Sierra presumption should 
apply to future challenges to the rates paid by the 107 parties to the Settlement 
Agreement.  FERC has also determined in advance that it will apply the public 
interest presumption to future challenges to auction prices paid by the eight non-
settling parties, while this article suggests that any such determination should be 
made if and when such a challenge arises. 
Notwithstanding the practical similarity between the outcome for the 
participants in Devon Power and the outcome that would arise following the 
analysis in this article, FERC’s Devon Power precedent will have significant 
consequences on regulated utilities.  The impact of FERC’s determination will be 
felt most significantly in proceedings that are resolved through settlement.  The 
Settlement Agreement in Devon Power resolved a unique situation.  Routine 
changes to rates set forth in tariffs and bilateral agreements will arise more 
frequently than issues associated with the New England capacity market that was 
the subject of the controversy in Devon Power.   
Since issuing its order on remand in Devon Power, FERC has addressed the 
inclusion of so-called “Mobile-Sierra clauses” in uncontested settlement 
agreements resolving proceedings to change rates set forth in tariffs several 
times.338  In the post-Devon Power cases, FERC found that because the rates at 
                                                                                                     
 336. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 14-17. 
 337. See Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.3d 845, 853-56 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n I, 520 F.3d 464, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Union Elec. Co. v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 890 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Cities of Newark v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 763 F.2d 533, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 338. See HIOS, supra note 185; Petal Gas Storage, LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 (2011); Southern LNG 
Co., 135 FERC ¶ 61,153 (2011); Carolina Gas, supra note 185; SCEG, supra note 185; FP&L, supra 
note 185.  A Mobile-Sierra clause states that future challenges to the terms of the agreement shall be 
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issue were set forth in tariffs, the rates were not BFRs, even though the proceedings 
were resolved through settlement.  Although the settling parties could impose the 
Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption on future challenges to the rates paid by 
the settlement parties, FERC directed the settlement parties to modify their 
settlement agreements so as not to impose the “public interest” presumption on 
future challenges or changes proposed by FERC acting sua sponte or non-settling 
parties.339  In these cases, FERC found that the individual circumstances in those 
cases “did not rise to the compelling level of those present in Devon Power so as to 
warrant binding [FERC] and non-settling third parties to a more rigorous 
application of the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard of review.”340 
Based on the analysis set forth above, FERC has erred in these cases by 
finding that the settlement agreements produced unilateral rates (or “tariff rates”) 
rather than BFRs (or “contract rates”).341  A voluntary settlement among the 
participants of a FERC proceeding is the result of negotiations and bargaining,342 
even though those negotiations did not take place prior to the filing of the proposed 
rate change.  Therefore, rates set forth in settlement agreements are BFRs for the 
customers that have joined the settlement agreement, and the Mobile-Sierra public 
interest presumption should apply to challenges to those BFRs.343  However, the 
rates would not be BFRs for entities that were not parties to the settlement 
agreement. 
For example, in South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. (“SCEG”), SCEG submitted 
to FERC a settlement agreement that was the result of negotiations between SCEG 
and four customers.344  As described above, FERC stated that the settlement 
agreement related to a tariff rate—not a BFR—and that FERC would use its 
discretion not to impose a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable 
                                                                                                     
subject to the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption.  As explained above, the inclusion of such 
clauses should be unnecessary because a settlement agreement produces a BFR and the public interest 
presumption automatically applies to a challenge to a BFR.  However, the current practice is to include 
Mobile-Sierra clauses in settlement agreements, indicating the parties’ wish for the public interest 
presumption to apply to future challenges to the settlement rates. 
 339. HIOS, supra note 185, at P 1; Petal Gas, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 1; Southern LNG, 135 FERC 
¶ 61,153 at P 1; Carolina Gas, supra note 185, at P 1; SCEG, supra note 185, at P 5-6;  FPL, supra note 
185, at P 11-12.   
 340. Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 36 (2011).  See HIOS, supra note 185, at P 5 24; 
Petal Gas, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 17; S. LNG, 135 FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 24; Carolina Gas, supra note 
185, at P 17; SCEG, supra note 185, at P 5;  FP&L, supra note 185, at P 11. 
 341. See HIOS, supra note 185, at P 19; Petal Gas, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 12; Southern LNG, 135 
FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 19; Carolina Gas, supra note 185, at P 17; SCEG, supra note 185, at P 5; FP&L, 
supra note 185, at P 11. 
 342. See, e.g., SCEG, supra note 185, at P 1 (stating that the settlement agreement was the result of 
negotiations between South Carolina Electric & Gas and its customers and resolved all the issues that 
were set for hearing). 
 343. See Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.3d 845, 853-56 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; Union Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 890 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Cities of Newark v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 763 F.2d 533, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
727 F.2d 1131, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1984).   
 344. SCEG, supra note 185, at P 1.  The four customers were Central Electric Power Cooperative, 
Inc., North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, the City of Orangeburg, South Carolina, and the 
Town of Winnsboro, South Carolina.  Id.   
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standard to future challenges to the settlement brought by FERC or non-settling 
third parties.345  This determination was error.  The rate set forth in the settlement 
agreement in SCEG constitutes a BFR between SCEG and the four customers that 
joined the settlement agreement.  If any entity challenges the rate paid by one of 
those four customers pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Mobile-Sierra 
public interest presumption should apply to that challenge, whether the challenge is 
brought by one of the four customers, FERC, or a non-party to the settlement.346  
As the Supreme Court explained in NRG, application of the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption does not depend upon the identity of the person challenging the rate at 
issue—i.e., whether the challenger is a party to contested agreement, or a third-
party.347   
The situation created by FERC in SCEG and other proceedings is likely to be 
repeated in cases that are resolved through settlement agreements.  The effects may 
be far-reaching because 80 to 90 percent of all rate proceedings set for hearing at 
FERC are resolved through settlement.348  When FERC determines that a rate set 
forth in a settlement agreement is not a BFR to which the Mobile-Sierra public 
interest presumption automatically applies, FERC will likely further determine that 
it and non-parties to the settlement are free to challenge the rate paid by settlement 
parties without presuming that the rates are just and reasonable.349  Just as in 
SCEG, these findings will be contrary to the principle that rates set forth in 
settlement agreements are BFRs and the holding from NRG—namely, that 
application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend upon the identity of 
the person challenging the rate.350  In these cases, the bargain struck by the parties 
to the settlement agreement will be subject to being overturned by challenges 
brought by FERC or non-parties to the settlement agreement.  Furthermore, FERC 
may be forced to re-visit issues that should have been finalized by settlement 
agreements.  This compromises the stability that is purported to be undergirded by 
the FPA’s agreement-based regulatory regime. 
It should be noted that if there were another customer under the tariff at issue 
in SCEG—a customer that was not a party to the settlement agreement—that third-
party customer could challenge the rate it pays under its own service agreement 
with SCEG without application of the public interest presumption to that challenge.  
This inconvenient situation may arise where a rate set forth in a tariff may be 
subject to differing applications of the just and reasonable standard depending on 
which customer’s rate is being challenged:  a settlement party’s rate, or a third 
party’s rate.  Although this is not the most convenient way for FERC or utilities to 
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701 (2010); see Dominion Transmission, 533 F.3d at 853-56; Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 476; 
Union Elec. Co., 890 F.2d at 1194-95; Cities of Newark, 763 F.2d at 546-47; Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d 
at 1139.   
 347. NRG, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 696-97.  
 348. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2012 CONGRESSIONAL 
PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST 75, 78 (2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-
docs/FY12-budg.pdf.   
 349. SCEG, supra note 185, at P 5; see also Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 455 (“FERC 
may be disinclined to grant settling parties heightened protections for extended periods.”). 
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deal with challenges to rates, it respects the wishes of parties to settlement 
agreements, adheres to the principle of contract stability, and properly recognizes 
that settlement agreements should automatically be subject to the Mobile-Sierra 
presumption because they are the result of negotiation and bargaining. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
FERC’s orders on remand in Devon Power and its subsequent orders 
addressing settlements have failed to recognize that settlement agreements are the 
result of negotiation and bargaining.  FERC believed that it does not need to apply 
the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption to future challenges to settlement 
rates.  The effects of FERC’s erroneous findings are potentially far-reaching 
because of the number of rate disputes that are resolved through settlement. 
Parties to a settlement negotiate, often painstakingly, to reach a resolution that 
is agreeable to all parties.  And, parties on both sides may “call that a bargain.  The 
best [they] ever had.”351  The public interest presumption is intended to preserve for 
parties the benefits of their bargains and to provide much-needed stability to 
electric industry participants.  FERC has undermined these goals.  If Devon Power 
is not corrected by the courts, FERC and the electric industry will continuously 
confront the effects of this decision.   
 
                                                                                                     
 351. THE WHO, Bargain, on WHO’S NEXT (Decca 1971). 
